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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a graphic designer named Charlie who works at a 
design firm based in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.1 On his first day of 
work, Charlie signs some paperwork, including an agreement not 
to compete. The noncompetition agreement (noncompete) provides 
that if Charlie separates from the firm, he must refrain from 
engaging in the business of graphic design within the parishes of 
East Baton Rouge, West Baton Rouge, Livingston, and Ascension 
for a period of two years. During the course of his employment, 
Charlie designs many graphics for the firm’s customers who 
submit online orders via the firm’s website. Two years later, 
however, the firm decides that it needs to lay off Charlie due to 
cutbacks.  
Though he is devastated, Charlie makes every effort to stay on 
his feet. He launches his own solo graphic design business, which 
he operates from his home in East Baton Rouge. His business’s 
website allows customers to submit online orders in exchange for 
Charlie’s graphic design services. So far, Charlie’s only customers 
are located beyond the geographic scope of the noncompete in 
Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana; Houston, Texas; and Nashville, 
Tennessee. After learning of Charlie’s website, however, his former 
employer files suit in East Baton Rouge Parish seeking to enforce 
the noncompete. If the employer’s suit is successful, Charlie would 
not be able to design graphics for anyone from his home in Baton 
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 1. This hypothetical is entirely fictional. 




Rouge, regardless of where his customers are located. Additionally, 
Charlie would be prohibited from doing so for two years.2 As a 
result of the noncompete, to earn a living he would be forced to 
either leave the restricted area if he wants to continue working as a 
graphic designer or take a job in another field outside of his 
expertise.  
Current Louisiana law in this area has two fundamental 
problems. First, there is very little clarity on whether Charlie ever 
actually breached the noncompete by taking on customers from 
outside of the restricted parishes. This problem is caused by the 
underdevelopment of the requisites for breaching an agreement by 
competing with the former employer for customers or other business. 
Essentially, the law focuses on geographic limitations to the exclusion 
of examining the actual competition involved in the case, even in 
situations where geographic boundaries are of little importance.3 
Additionally, reported appellate litigation has yet to squarely face a 
situation involving Internet competition. Second, assuming Charlie’s 
conduct does constitute a breach of the noncompete, the agreement 
would enjoin Charlie for two full years, which is far longer than 
necessary today given the modern reformulation of “knowledge 
assets” and the rise of the Internet.4 
These two problems—(1) ambiguity in the jurisprudence as to 
what activity constitutes competition, and (2) inequity resulting 
from enforcing restraints on ex-employees for two full years when 
provided by the agreement5—though they existed prior to the rise 
                                                                                                             
 2. He may face the additional problem of losing currency in relevant software 
after returning to the market two years later. See Creative Cloud/Common 
Questions, ADOBE.COM, https://helpx.adobe.com/creative-cloud/faq.html, archived 
at https://perma.cc/RKB5-D4BY (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (noting changes in 
design software). Many industries face similar continuous training requirements.  
 3. See Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based 
Theory To Determine Covenant Not To Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 
980, 982 (2012) (arguing that most states have failed to take into account “the 
new concepts of boundary-less commerce and knowledge assets” in formulating 
noncompete law). 
 4. See id. at 982; Richard R. Mann & Barry S. Roberts, Cyberlaw: A Brave 
New World, 106 DICK. L. REV. 305, 339 (2011). To the extent that the two-year 
restriction’s usefulness is diminished, the concern for preventing a person from 
engaging in the trade that person has chosen to pursue becomes more 
problematic. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 625, 686–87 (1960) (discussing the balancing of employer and 
employee interests to “maximiz[e] the social values”). 
 5. This Comment does not argue that two years is inequitable in all cases. 
There are a growing number of situations, however, where a shorter time is 
justified given the fast-paced nature of many businesses today. See Katherine 
V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human 
Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 732 (2002) (noting 




of the Internet,6 have been fueled by it.7 Neither the Louisiana 
Legislature nor Louisiana courts have reevaluated noncompete law 
in light of the vast societal changes brought on by the Internet age 
and the rise of Internet-intensive businesses.8  
This Comment proposes a multi-step approach to alleviate the 
current problems presented by Louisiana’s noncompete law. Since 
the problem of ambiguity as to what constitutes competition is 
largely of jurisprudential origin,9 Louisiana courts can solve the 
problem by focusing on the impact a former employee’s new 
employment would have on the former employer and enforcing the 
noncompete only if there is actual or likely competitive impact.10 
                                                                                                             
 
the vast changes recently caused by decentralization in the workplace); Kenneth 
G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology: 
Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 11 (2001); see also 
infra Part III.A.  
 6. These broader implications are part of the importance in having a 
solution that fits with both traditional and Internet-intensive companies. See 
generally infra Part IV. 
 7. The Louisiana noncompete statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
23:921, allows enforcement against an employee when he engages in a similar 
business to the employer “so long as the employer carries on a like business” in 
the areas listed in the noncompete. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 
2015). Another example of this problem exists in the context of personal 
jurisdiction when a defendant interacts with the forum solely over the Internet. 
The difficulty courts have had in figuring out what counts as minimum contacts 
for Due Process purposes illustrates the main disconnect between the Internet 
and prior doctrine, which is that a person’s location is far less relevant to their 
activities in any given area. See, e.g., Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1240 
(10th Cir. 2011) (“The basic problem with relating such activities directly to the 
general principles developed pre-internet is that, in a sense, the internet operates 
‘in’ every state regardless of where the user is physically located, potentially 
rendering the territorial limits of personal jurisdiction meaningless.”). 
 8. This Comment will use the term “Internet-intensive businesses” as 
short-hand for ventures that rely heavily on the Internet as a central part of their 
business models. Types of ventures that might fit into the category of Internet-
intensive would include technology companies, website operations, online sales 
catalogs, the myriad of client services industries that operate over the Internet, 
and other similarly Internet-dependent companies. 
 9. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 10. There is also ambiguity in the statutory language itself, which lends itself 
to jurisprudential gloss. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 10 (2015) (“When the language of 
the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the 
meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.”). This type of analysis 
resembles a reasonableness test, in that in other jurisdictions it is the impact that an 
employee’s conduct would have on a former employer that makes enforcement 
reasonable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1)(a) (1981) 
(providing that a noncompete is unreasonable when “the restraint is greater than is 
needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest”). 




With respect to the two-year restraint, legislative intervention is 
necessary. The Legislature should amend the employment 
noncompete statute to allow restraint of the former employee for a 
reasonable time up to two years, which would allow courts to 
consider the competing interests in each case and cut the 
enforcement period short where appropriate.  
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of other states’ 
and Louisiana’s approaches to the enforceability of noncompete 
agreements, specifying the policies underlying their enforcement. 
Part II deals with specific facets of Louisiana noncompete law, 
explicating the elements of enforceability under the noncompete 
statute. The problems with the current law, as exemplified by the 
law’s application to Internet-intensive businesses, are discussed in 
Part III. Finally, Part IV urges both Louisiana courts and the 
Legislature to respond to the inequities and inconsistencies created 
by the application of the current law to situations like that of 
Charlie the graphic designer, who would be forced to take a job 
outside of his specialty, forego work for two years, or move away 
to work as a graphic designer. 
I. SAME POINT OF DEPARTURE, DIFFERENT END RESULT—THE 
MOVING TARGET OF LOUISIANA NONCOMPETE POLICY 
Louisiana began many years ago with the same proposition as 
that of many other states: noncompetes are against public policy.11 
The development of this policy and its reflection in the basic rules 
of enforcement of noncompetes have shifted in almost every state 
over the years.12 In Louisiana, this development has led to 
considerable judicial and legislative ambivalence as to the state’s 
policy on noncompetes. 
                                                                                                             
 11. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (1950); Michael J. Garrison & John 
T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent 
Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 120 (2008) 
(“Traditionally, state restraint of trade statutes either prohibited employee 
agreements not to compete or severely restricted the circumstances under which 
such agreements could be enforced.”). Agreements not to compete arise in many 
different situations beyond employment, including, for example, in connection 
with the sale of a business. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(B) (Supp. 
2015). This Comment focuses on agreements between employers and employees 
wherein the employee agrees not to engage in competition with a former 
employer after separating from that employer, which Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines as “[a] promise, usu. in a sale-of-business, partnership, or employment 
contract, not to engage in the same type of business for a stated time in the same 
market as the buyer, partner, or employer.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 420 (9th 
ed. 2009). 
 12. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 11, at 120. 




A. General Trends in Noncompete Enforceability and the 
Competing Interests of Enforceability 
Louisiana is in good company in allowing noncompetes under 
limited circumstances, provided that those agreements are subject 
to legislative and judicial oversight.13 In the United States, only 
California rejects the enforcement of noncompetes altogether.14 A 
general survey of the basic law and policies animating noncompete 
law in the rest of the country shows that Louisiana’s law has 
increasingly diverged from the law in the rest of the country.15  
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts classifies noncompetes 
as one type of ancillary restraint on competition that is subject to 
the “rule of reason.”16 Legislatures and courts have adopted this 
rule of reason in a large majority of jurisdictions.17 Twenty states 
have enacted statutes on the enforceability of employment 
noncompetes, including Louisiana.18 Many other states’ statutes 
                                                                                                             
 13. See infra note 18 (listing state statutes governing noncompete 
agreements). 
 14. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–16602.5 (West 2008). See Edwards 
v. Arthur Anderson, L.L.P., 189 P.3d 285, 292–93 (Cal. 2008) (noting the lack 
of any exception to the prohibition on the enforceability of noncompetes). 
 15. Though approximately 20 states have statutes governing noncompetes 
as Louisiana does, very few of these provide for enforcement for two years, and 
most incorporate a reasonableness standard. See infra note 18. This Section is 
not intended to explain the law of any one state. Rather, the goal is to provide a 
sense of the major trends in approaching noncompete enforceability, especially 
with regard to the various policies that courts and legislatures find important 
when determining the extent of enforceability of noncompetes.  
 16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. a (1981). 
 17. Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information 
Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing 
Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1173 (2001) (pointing out that 
the “vast majority of jurisdictions have taken the position that noncompete 
agreements are enforceable if reasonable”). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 
(West 2013); Moore v. Midwest Distribution, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2002) (“In order for such a covenant to be enforceable, three requirements 
must be met: (1) the covenantee must have a valid interest to protect; (2) the 
geographical restriction must not be overly broad; and (3) a reasonable time 
limit must be imposed.” (quoting Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 818 
S.W.2d 596, 597–98 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991))).  
 18. ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (2002); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–16602.5 
(West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
542.33 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-53 (Supp. 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 480-4(C) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-2701 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a (West 2011); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 431.202 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-704 (2013); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.200 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4 (West 
2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219A 
(West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295 (West 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 




explicitly require the courts to examine the reasonableness of 
temporal and geographic restrictions.19 Some statutes cite directly 
to the rule of reason, legislatively incorporating the judicially 
created rule.20 Other statutes direct courts to examine the 
reasonableness of the agreement in specific ways.21 One type of 
specified reasonableness is the statutory requirement that 
noncompetes further the “employer’s legitimate business interests” 
in order to be enforced.22 Whether by statute or common law, most 
states consider three major policy concerns when determining the 
reasonableness of a noncompete agreement: the interests of the 
employer, the employee, and the public.23  
With respect to the competing interests at play in all 
noncompetes, employers might see noncompetes as “the only 
effective method of preventing unscrupulous competitors or 
employees from appropriating valuable trade information and 
customer relationships for their own benefit,” or as helpful to 
                                                                                                             
 
§§ 53-9-8 to 53-9-12 (2004 & Supp. 2014); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 15.50–
15.52 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 2010). Although 20 states 
have statutes on the books that apparently govern, the courts of at least 1 of these 
states—Ohio—do not reference the statute in employment noncompete cases. See 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1331.01–1331.02, 1331.04 (West 2002); Premier 
Assocs. v. Loper, 778 N.E.2d 630 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (action to enforce 
noncompete, but court does not mention the statute). The other 30 states regulate 
noncompetes by common law.  
 19. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(C) (2008) (allowing noncompetes 
“within such time as may be reasonably necessary for the protection of the 
employer or principal, without imposing undue hardship on the employee or 
agent”). 
 20. See id.  
 21. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 431.202 (West 2010). The Alabama statute 
reads similarly to Louisiana’s statute, but it has been interpreted to incorporate a 
reasonableness inquiry. ALA. CODE § 8-1-1(6) (West 2002). See, e.g., Cent. 
Bancshares of the S. v. Puckett, 584 So. 2d 829, 831 (Ala. 1991); see also 
Roberson v. C.P. Allen Constr. Co., 50 So. 3d 471, 474 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) 
(“Alabama courts will enforce a non-compete agreement if it (1) falls within a 
statutory exception to the general prohibition, and (2) is reasonably limited as to 
territory, duration and subject matter.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The 
current version of the Louisiana statute is based on the Florida and Alabama 
statutes. See Carey C. Lyon, Comment, Oppress the Employee: Louisiana’s 
Approach to Noncompetition Agreements, 61 LA. L. REV. 605, 607 (2001). 
 22. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-2701 (2014). 
 23. Daniel R. Anderson, Restricting Social Graces: The Implications of 
Social Media for Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts, 72 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 881, 885–86 (2011); James M. Duncan, Comment, Agreements Not to 
Compete, 33 LA. L. REV. 94, 94 (1972) (discussing the idea that most 
jurisdictions will enforce agreements that “afford fair protection to the interests 
of the covenantee and [are] not so comprehensive as to impinge unreasonably 
upon the public interest or to place undue hardship on the party restricted”). 




prevent loss associated with employees leaving after the employer 
has invested time and money in training the employee.24 Employees, 
on the other hand, might view noncompetes as “reduc[ing] both 
[their] economic mobility . . . and their personal freedom to follow 
their own interests” and might also be concerned with bargaining 
power.25 The public interest requires consideration of broad policy 
implications of noncompete enforcement. Though these policies can 
vary widely, one often-cited interest of the public is in “free 
mobility of labor, ensuring that skilled employees can gravitate 
toward their best usefulness.”26 Another public policy is one that 
frowns upon the creation of unemployment and interference with 
labor markets generally.27 
Striking a balance between the interests of the employer, 
employee, and public depends not only on policy choices, but also 
on who makes those choices, since the courts and the legislature 
have different institutional competencies.28 At least one 
commentator has suggested that legislatures are better suited for 
formulating rules for the enforcement of noncompetes.29 This 
argument stems from the view that legislatures are generally seen as 
better suited for “policy-based, interest balancing” issues, such as 
the reasonableness of noncompetes.30 On the other side of the 
argument, however, is the idea that specific legislative rules might 
be too inflexible to deal with the “unforeseen inequities” that might 
                                                                                                             
 24. Blake, supra note 4, at 627, 652.  
 25. Id. at 627. See Nat’l Motor Club of La., Inc. v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238, 
241 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1965) (noting a “disparity in bargaining power, under 
which an employee, fearful of losing his means of livelihood, cannot readily 
refuse to sign an agreement which, if enforceable, amounts to his contracting 
away his liberty to earn his livelihood in the field of his experience except by 
continuing in the employment of his present employer”). 
 26. Anderson, supra note 23, at 886. Some have argued that the public 
interest is simply in striking the proper balance between the employer and 
employee interests. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 4, at 686–87. This view does not 
conflict with a separate consideration of the public interest, because a proper 
balancing of those interests requires considering consequences of noncompetes 
that neither the employer nor the employee would concern themselves with, 
such as the economy as a whole. See Bishara & Orozco, supra note 3, at 993.  
 27. See Stone, supra note 5, at 740.  
 28. See James R. Rogers, Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling 
Game of Legislative–Judicial Interaction, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 84, 84 (2001) 
(discussing the forward-looking legislative and the backward-looking judicial 
approaches). 
 29. Emily J. Kuo, Comment, The Enforceability Gap of Covenants Not to 
Compete in Telecommuting Employment Relationships, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
565, 583–85 (1996) (arguing that legislatures are better suited for making 
noncompete policy for telecommuting employees). 
 30. Id. at 583. 




result from creating rules in an area that is rapidly changing,31 such 
as in Internet-intensive business.  
B. Louisiana’s Legal Tennis Match Between the Courts and the 
Legislature on the Extent of Noncompete Enforceability 
Before 1934, employer–employee noncompetes were largely 
unenforceable in Louisiana.32 Although some cases occasionally 
enforced noncompetes under a reasonableness standard,33 the 
agreements were predominantly held to be unenforceable.34 In 
1934, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act No. 133, which 
provided that any contract whereby “the employee agrees and 
contracts not to engage in any competing business for themselves 
or as the employee of another upon the termination of their 
contracts with such employer . . . shall be null and void as to those 
provisions.”35 This Act later appeared as Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 23:921 upon compilation of the Louisiana Revised 
Statutes,36 where it has remained, subject to amendment. Courts 
                                                                                                             
 31. See id. at 585 (“[S]ince telecommuting is a rapidly growing practice, the 
inflexible legislatures may need to rely upon courts to respond to unforeseen 
inequities.”). 
 32. Often, the grounds for nonenforcement were lack of mutuality or 
“serious consideration.” Duncan, supra note 23, at 98–99; M. Nan Alessandra & 
Barry L. LaCour, The Past, Present and Future of Noncompetition Agreements 
in Louisiana: A Drafter’s Dilemma, 49 LOY. L. REV. 809, 813 (2003); Pitcher v. 
United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 139 So. 760, 761–62 (La. 1932). Another line of 
cases, including Moorman & Givens v. Parkerson, found that reasonable 
agreements as to time and geography would be enforceable. Moorman & Givens 
v. Parkerson, 54 So. 47, 47–48 (La. 1911). One commentator cites this line of 
cases for the assertion that the general rule prior to the adoption of the statute 
was a reasonableness test. See, e.g., Albert O. Saulsbury, IV, Devil Inside the 
Deal: An Examination of Louisiana Noncompete Agreements in Business 
Acquisitions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 713, 719 (2012). Though there is some 
disagreement in the scholarship as to the primary basis for unenforceability, it 
seems clear that the majority of noncompetes were held to be unenforceable 
during this period. See Duncan, supra note 23, at 97–98. 
 33. See, e.g., Parkerson, 54 So. at 47–48 (making the overbroad statement 
that “contracts whereby men bind themselves never thereafter to pursue a 
particular calling, within certain, reasonable, geographical limits, or not to 
pursue such calling at all within a limited and reasonable time, are generally 
upheld”). 
 34. Duncan, supra note 23, at 98–99. See also Shreveport Laundries v. 
Teagle, 139 So. 563, 567–68 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1932) (finding a noncompete 
unenforceable for lack of serious consideration); Blanchard v. Haber, 118 So. 
117, 119 (La. 1928) (refusing to enforce a noncompete for lack of mutuality). 
 35. Act No. 133, 1934 La. Acts 484–85.  
 36. Id. For a discussion of the compilation of the Revised Statutes, see Dale 
E. Bennett, Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, 11 LA. L. REV. 4, 5 (1950). Prior 
to this revision, the language of the noncompete statute read slightly differently, 




interpreting and applying the statute articulated the policy as one of 
individual freedom and free enterprise combined with a concern for 
disparate bargaining power.37 After almost 30 years of universal 
unenforceability of employer–employee noncompetes, however, the 
Legislature changed course in 1962 by providing exceptions to 
unenforceability.38 This was the first move in a policy tennis match 
between the courts and the Louisiana Legislature over the extent and 
circumstances of enforcing employer–employee noncompetes.39 
1. The Legislature Serves the Ball40—The 1962 Amendment  
In 1962, the Legislature started the tennis match by adding two 
exceptions to the unenforceability of noncompetes.41 The 
amendment provided for enforcement “in those cases where the 
employer [either] incur[red] an expense in the training of the 
employee or incur[red] an expense in the advertisement of the 
business that the employer [wa]s engaged in.”42 Both of these 
exceptions required the agreement to be voluntary and were 
limited to “not enter[ing] into the same business that [the] 
employer [wa]s engaged in over the same route or in the same 
territory for a period of two (2) years.”43 
                                                                                                             
 
with the revision simply cleaning up and modernizing the language. Act No. 
133, 1934 La. Acts 484–85; Bennett, supra, at 6, 14–15 (“[T]he provisions of 
the Revised Statutes are not to be treated as new laws.”).  
 37. See, e.g., Nat’l Motor Club of La., Inc. v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238, 241 
(La. Ct. App. 3d 1965).  
 38. Act No. 104, 1962 La. Acts 251–52. 
 39. This tennis match of policy provides possible clues as to legislative 
intent, which is of utmost importance when the language of the statute is 
ambiguous. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 10 (2013) (“When the language of the law is 
susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning 
that best conforms to the purpose of the law.”). Watching the tennis match also 
proves instructive in attempting to resolve the problems created or exacerbated 
by the advent of Internet-intensive businesses.  
 40. For an overview of the types of shots in tennis, see Tennis Shots, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tennis_shots, archived at http://perma.cc 
/AWA4-MHJH (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). See also Glossary of Tennis Terms, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glossary_of_tennis_terms, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/647R-XMPU (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
 41. Act No. 104, 1962 La. Acts 251–52. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 




2. The Judiciary Returns the Ball—Orkin Exterminating Co. v. 
Foti 
The Louisiana Supreme Court responded in 1974 by narrowing 
the statute’s application. In Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, the 
Court held that the noncompete statute allowed enforcement only 
where the employer had “invested substantial sums” in either the 
employee’s training or in the employer’s advertisement of the 
business.44 Furthermore, language in the Foti decision indicated 
that when these substantial expenses related to the advertisement 
of the business, the employer had to advertise “the employee’s 
connection with his business” in order to fall within the 1962 
exception.45 The Court in Foti, therefore, significantly narrowed 
the enforceability of noncompetes under the statute. 
3. The Legislature Forehands to the Elbow46—The 1989 
Amendment  
The next major shift came in 1989 when the Legislature 
completely reformulated section 23:921, broadening both its scope 
and the enforceability of employer–employee noncompetes, with 
the rules relevant to employer–employee noncompetes appearing 
in subsection C of the statute.47 The Legislature removed the 
requirement that employers incur expenses and the requirement 
that enforcement hinge on spending money on “training of the 
employee” or “advertisement of the business,”48 which arguably 
                                                                                                             
 44. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593, 596 (La. 1974). 
 45. Id. at 597. Although this reading of the statute seems to rest on sound 
logic, there is an argument that the plain language of the statute only requires 
consideration of the business that the employer is engaged in, which, read 
broadly, might include advertisement not directly relating to the employee.  
 46. The elbow is the back corner of the court where the baseline, the back-
most boundary line (where players stand to serve), meets the doubles alley. 
Glossary of Tennis Terms, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glossary_of 
_tennis_terms, archived at http://perma.cc/WWA5-CWTP (last visited Feb. 11, 
2015). 
 47. See Act No. 639, 1989 La. Acts 1836–37. The Legislature broadened its 
scope such that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:921 applied to many other 
types of noncompetes, including those between business partners and those 
resulting from the sale of a business. Id. The amendment also drew a distinction 
between noncompetes and non-solicitation agreements, saying that the employee 
could “agree with his employer to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a 
business similar to that of the employer and/or from soliciting customers of the 
employer within a specified parish or parishes.” Id.  
 48. See id. Subsection (C) of Act 639 states: 
C. A person who is employed as an agent, servant, or employee may 
agree with his employer to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a 




constituted Louisiana’s legislative formulation of reasonableness.49 
In making these changes, the Legislature broadened enforcement of 
noncompetes, allowing them for up to two years as long as the 
former employee engaged in a similar business within the specified 
geography of the agreement.50 Since the amendment seemed to have 
removed much of the discretion from the courts, it was a stark 
departure from most other states, which largely required judicial 
consideration of reasonableness or furtherance of legitimate business 
interests—a requirement that most states maintain today.51  
4. The Judiciary Lobs a Return—SWAT 24 Shreveport 
Bossier, Inc. v. Bond  
The next major change occurred by judicial interpretation in 
2001 when the Louisiana Supreme Court decided SWAT 24 
Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond.52 The Court resolved a circuit split 
                                                                                                             
 
business similar to that of the employer and/or from soliciting 
customers of the employer within a specified parish or parishes, 
municipality or municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer 
carries on a like business therein, not to exceed a period of two years. 
Id. 
 49. In this way, the prior law was similar to other jurisdictions with 
statutory schemes governing enforceability of noncompetes, as well as to the 
common law regimes of the majority of states, since many states consider what 
interest the employer has at stake in determining whether to enforce 
noncompetes as reasonable. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(C) (2008); 
Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 551 P.2d 163, 170 (1976) (using the Hawaii statute 
to analyze the reasonableness of the restriction). 
 50. Act No. 639, 1989 La. Acts 1836–37. Because the specific factual 
exceptions were no longer mentioned, in that certain types of expenses did not 
need to be made in order to enforce a noncompete, this amendment is a strong 
broadening of noncompete enforceability.  
 51. Prior to this amendment, Louisiana’s statute was very similar to others. 
The 1989 amendment also drew from other states, namely Alabama and Florida. 
Lyon, supra note 21, at 607. However, the vast majority of states still followed 
the reasonableness test and provided specifically protected interests either by 
statute or by caselaw. See supra Part I.A. The amendment also broadened the 
scope of the statute, so that the courts could no longer simply apply the 
reasonableness test to, for example, agreements between partners. LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 23:921(K) (Supp. 2015); Jeffrey D. Morgan, Comment, If at First 
You Don’t Succeed: Louisiana’s Latest Statutory Enactment Governing 
Agreements Not to Compete, 66 TUL. L. REV. 551, 561–62 (1991). 
 52. 808 So. 2d 294 (La. 2001). Some other developments in noncompete 
law in Louisiana transpired between 1989 and 2001, but these are not relevant to 
the overall back and forth between the courts and the Legislature illustrated 
here. The most important of these developments, one that significantly affected 
noncompete enforceability, was AMCOM v. Battson, 666 So. 2d 1227 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d ), rev’d, 670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996) (mem.). See supra Part II. Some of 




by interpreting “the phrase [in 23:921] ‘carrying on or engaging in 
a business similar’ to mean that [an] employee may agree to refrain 
from carrying on or engaging in his own business,” but not to 
include situations in which the employee goes to work for an 
existing entity.53 In support of its holding, the Court first noted that 
the language in Revised Statutes section 23:921 was subject to 
differing interpretations and that the Court must, therefore, “apply 
and interpret it in a manner that is logical and consistent with the 
presumed fair purpose and intention the legislature had in enacting 
it.”54 The Court then pointed out that unlike the then-current 
version of the statute, the 1962 version “clearly provided that an 
employer could not require any employee to enter into any contract 
restricting the employee from engaging in any competing business 
for himself or as the employee of another.”55 The Court found the 
absence of the formerly used language important because a change 
in language is “presumed to have intended to change the law.”56  
Justice Traylor dissented in SWAT 24.57 His dissent argued that 
the Court in both Foti and SWAT 24 ignored the legislative intent 
behind section 23:921 as well as modern business realities.58 After 
outlining the legislative history of the noncompete statute and 
engaging in a discussion of the plain meaning of the terms “carry 
on” and “engage,” Justice Traylor concluded that individuals 
should still fall under the exception when they work for an existing 
competitor rather than working for themselves.59 
                                                                                                             
 
the history, including Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence, is omitted here as 
irrelevant to the focus of this Comment. For a discussion of the statutory and 
related jurisprudential history between 1989 and 2001, see Alessandra & 
LaCour, supra note 32, at 817–26; Loretta G. Mince, Note, Louisiana Smoked 
Products, Inc. v. Savoie’s Sausage and Food Products, Inc.: “If You Like Laws 
and Sausages. . .”, 44 LOY. L. REV. 327 (1998). 
 53. SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 307. 
 54. Id. at 303. 
 55. Id. at 303–04. 
 56. Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Id. at 310. Although it did legislate contrary to the majority, the 
Legislature likely did not adopt the dissent’s position here since it was not 
discussed at all in the legislative history. Daniel S. Terrell, Note, The Louisiana 
Legislature’s Response to Swat 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond: The 
Noncompete Pendulum Swings Toward Debt Peonage. Will the Judiciary’s 
Answer Achieve the Fragile Employer–Employee Balance?, 64 LA. L. REV. 699, 
715 (2004) (“It would be pure conjecture to declare that the Amendment 
represents an adoption of Justice Traylor’s dissent, as the committee did not 
even recognize the dissenting opinion’s existence.”). 
 58. SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 310.  
 59. Id. at 318. 




5. The Legislature Rushes the Net and Slams the Ball—The 
2003 Amendment 
Two years after the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in 
SWAT 24, the Legislature again responded by amending section 
23:921, this time adding a new subsection.60 The new subsection, 
which remains unchanged as of the publication date of this 
Comment, provides that employer–employee noncompetes are 
enforceable even when the former employee is not an owner of the 
subsequent business.61 Although the legislative history is equivocal 
at best, it appears from both the current language of the statute and 
the discussion of SWAT 24 in committee that the Legislature 
intended this amendment to overrule SWAT 24.62 Subsequent 
jurisprudence has also interpreted this amendment as rejecting 
SWAT 24.63 One commentator pointed out that the discussion of the 
bill in committee, though ambiguous and sometimes erroneous, does 
at least suggest that the committee wanted to favor employer 
protection, overrule SWAT 24, and equitably enforce noncompetes.64  
                                                                                                             
 60. Act No. 428, 2003 La. Acts 1791 (“For the purposes of Subsections B 
and C, a person who becomes employed by a competing business, regardless of 
whether or not that person is an owner or equity interest holder of that 
competing business, may be deemed to be carrying on or engaging in a business 
similar to that of the party having a contractual right to prevent that person from 
competing.”). 
 61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(D) (Supp. 2015). 
 62. See id.; Apr. 30th Hearing Before the House Comm. on Labor and Indus. 
Relations, 2003 Leg., 104th Reg. Sess. (La. 2003) [hereinafter House Committee], 
available at http://house .louisiana.gov/H_Video/2003/Apr2003.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/V9GY-ZKJQ?type=live (pertinent discussion begins at 25:20). For 
a detailed discussion of the legislative history, specifically the Labor Committee 
meeting in which the bill received the most discussion, see Terrell, supra note 57, 
at 716. 
 63. Green Clinic, L.L.C. v. Finley, 30 So. 3d 1094, 1098 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
2010) (“However, SWAT 24’s narrow interpretation of ‘carrying on and 
engaging in a business similar to that of the employer’ in La. R.S. 23:921(C) 
was legislatively overruled.”). 
 64. Terrell, supra note 57, at 712–16; House Committee, supra note 62. It 
seems from the record of the House Committee meeting that, as the 
commentator points out, Representative Smith, the bill’s sponsor, fundamentally 
“misunderstood his own bill, believing that his hypothetical employee’s choice 
to redeem the stock for cash precluded enforcement of the noncompete 
agreement.” Terrell, supra note 57, at 715. Representative Smith’s hypothetical, 
about an upper-level employee who receives stock options in exchange for his 
signing a noncompete agreement, and who opts for a cash buy-out of his stock 
on termination “for cause” and then subsequently competes with the first 
company, seems to contemplate only one narrow situation—stock options and a 
for cause termination—where the amendment would require enforcement when 
prior law had not. House Committee, supra note 62. See also Terrell, supra note 
57, at 715. Thus, the legislative history might militate toward a more narrow 




6. The Judiciary Misses the Return—Possible Softening of 
Louisiana’s Public Policy Against Noncompetes 
Although several other amendments have been added to the 
statute over the years,65 only one has possible import in employer–
employee noncompetes. That amendment, in 2010, added that 
despite the general prohibition against “exercising a lawful 
profession, trade, or business of any kind, except as provided” in 
the statute, “every contract or agreement, or provision thereof, which 
meets the exceptions as provided in this Section, shall be 
enforceable.”66 Although this statement on its face seems to be a mere 
positive restatement of the negative implication of the first sentence 
of the subsection,67 one commentator posits that it might represent a 
shift in policy toward greater enforcement of noncompetes simply 
by virtue of being a positive statement of enforceability of the 
exceptions rather than a negative statement of the general rule of 
                                                                                                             
 
interpretation of the statute than the plain meaning. This possible legislative 
intent is relevant to the statute’s interpretation to the extent that the language is 
ambiguous. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2015) (“When a law is clear and unambiguous 
and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be 
applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the 
intent of the legislature.”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 10 (2015) (“When the language of 
the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the 
meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.”). 
 65. Act No. 137, 1990 La. Acts 458–60 (relative to confidential computer 
programs and preliminary injunctions); Act No. 201, 1990 La. Acts 579–80 
(reenacting certain sections with amendments); Act No. 891, 1991 La. Acts 
2692–94 (enacting section controlling franchise agreements); Act No. 937, 1995 
La. Acts 2516–17 (amending portion of subpart C relevant to corporations and 
shareholders); Act No. 58, 1999 La. Acts 778–79 (relative to choice of laws and 
forum selection clauses in employment relationships); Act No. 436, 2006 La. 
Acts 1752 (providing unenforceability of noncompetes with automobile 
salesmen); Act No. 399, 2008 La. Acts 1802–03 (amending subparts relevant 
agreements in corporation, shareholder, partnership, and limited liability 
company relationships); Act No. 711, 2008 La. Acts 2756–57 (amending 
franchise agreement provisions). 
 66. Act No. 164, 2010 La. Acts 1348–49. 
 67. Indeed, Jim Patterson, on behalf of the Louisiana Association of 
Business and Industry, acknowledged as much in conceding that it was a fair 
statement to say that “the new language basically say[s] what the old language 
said.” See Hearing on S.B. 194 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
Consumer Protection and Int’l Affairs, 2010 Leg., 111th Reg. Sess. (La. 2010) 
[hereinafter Senate Committee] (statement of Jim Patterson), available at 
http://senate.la.gov/Commerce/Archives/2010/video.htm, archived at http://perma 
.cc/7E62-PY7Z.  




unenforceability.68 This possibility is supported by the legislative 
history in which the lobbyist group that brought the bill stated that it 
did so in an effort to “clarify the intent of the law” on 
noncompetes’ enforceability.69 
Though it is true that the policies underlying the enforceability 
of noncompetition agreements have shifted in Louisiana,70 courts 
continue to point out that the general rule is that these types of 
agreements are “null and void” under the statute.71 Since the 
provisions allowing enforceability under the statute are categorized 
as exceptions,72 courts have consistently stated that part (C) of the 
statute, the employer–employee noncompete provision, should be 
interpreted narrowly.73 Similarly, because these agreements are “in 
derogation of the common right” of unrestricted employment, the 
agreements themselves “must be strictly construed against the 
party seeking their enforcement.”74 These recitations, rather than 
                                                                                                             
 68. Saulsbury, supra note 32, at 747 (noting that the 2010 amendment might 
be seen as “an attempt to soften the ‘strong public policy’ against the 
enforcement of noncompetes”). This author is aware of no cases that cite this 
recent change for the proposal that it changed the policy behind the statute.  
 69. Mr. Patterson presented the bill to the Senate committee, stating that it 
was “intended to address a question that has developed within some of the 
courts as to the intent of the legislature with regard to contracts that govern 
corporations, franchises, and employer–employee relationships.” Senate 
Committee, supra note 67. Further, Mr. Patterson stated that, “[a]ll we’re trying 
to do is clarify the intent of the law as regards the section that it applies to.” Id. 
 70. See discussion supra Part I.B.6. 
 71. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A)(1) (Supp. 2015). See, e.g., Action 
Revenue Recovery, L.L.C. v. eBusiness Grp., L.L.C., 17 So. 3d 999, 1002 (La. 
Ct. App. 2d 2009) (“Such agreements are in derogation of the common right and 
must be strictly construed against the party seeking their enforcement.”); 
Acadian Cypress & Hardwood Inc. v. Stewart, 121 So. 3d 667, 669 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 2013) (“Such agreements are deemed to be against public policy, 
except under the limited circumstances delineated by statute.”). 
 72. Subsection (A) of the statute has, since 1989, stated the general rule that 
noncompetes are unenforceable with the exception of those fitting into one of 
the following subsections. Act No. 639, 1989 La. Acts 1836–37. 
 73. See, e.g., Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 951 So. 2d 247, 255 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 2006) (“LSA–R.S. 23:921(C) is an exception to Louisiana public 
policy against non-compete agreements and as such, must be strictly 
construed.”). 
 74. Green Clinic, L.L.C. v. Finley, 30 So. 3d 1094, 1097 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
2010). Despite their exceptional status, these agreements do still fall under the 
general rules of contractual interpretation contained in Louisiana Civil Code 
articles 2045–2057. See SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 
294, 307 (La. 2001). It should be pointed out that the recent amendments to the 
statute in the context of employer–employee noncompetes do not apply 
retroactively, so that the law that governs an employment noncompete contract 
is the law at the time of the execution of that contract. Sola Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Bailey, 861 So. 2d 822, 828 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2003). This is not true for every 




revealing a continuing commitment to the original policy of the 
statute, show that there is some ambivalence on the part of the courts 
with respect to noncompete enforcement. The courts continue to 
recite the policy of narrowness while broadly applying the statutory 
requirements with seeming disregard to the overarching policy.75  
II. TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER—THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
ENFORCING A NONCOMPETE IN LOUISIANA 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:921 provides three 
overarching requirements for employer–employee noncompetes: (1) 
a two-year maximum duration, (2) a list of the areas in which the 
former employee is restrained, and (3) competition between the 
former employee and employer.76 The current Louisiana noncompete 
statute provides, in pertinent part: 
A. (1) Every contract or agreement, or provision thereof, by 
which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful 
profession, trade, or business of any kind, except as provided 
in this Section, shall be null and void. However, every 
contract or agreement, or provision thereof, which meets the 
exceptions as provided in this Section, shall be enforceable. 
 
. . . . 
                                                                                                             
 
amendment to this statute. For example, the 1999 amendments on forum 
selection clauses apply retroactively to agreements entered into prior to the 
amendment’s effective date. Sawicki v. K/S Stavanger Prince, 802 So. 2d 598, 
606 (La. 2001). 
 75. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2015). One example of the 
disregard courts have toward this policy against noncompetes is the doctrine of 
reformation, in which a court can enforce a noncompete even when it is 
unenforceable on its face for having overbroad geographical coverage, simply 
by reforming the agreement and enforcing it in the parishes in which the 
employer does business. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 76. Although the last category, competition, is implied by the language 
“carrying on or engaging in a like business therein,” so that it looks more like a 
subcategory of the geographic restriction, competition should be considered 
independently of geography, as there can be no enforcement of a noncompetition 
agreement if it is not violated, and the violation only occurs when the prior 
employee competes. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015).  
Under the express language of the statute and the majority view of the 
Louisiana Courts of Appeal, the statutory requirement is two-fold: the 
geographic scope of non-compete/non-solicit clauses must 1) list the 
parishes (counties) or municipalities in which the clauses apply, and 2) 
must be areas in which the employer actually does business.  
Lobrano v. C. H. Robinson Worldwide Inc., No. 10-CV-1775, 2011 WL 52602, 
at *7 (W.D. La. Jan. 7, 2011). 





C. Any person, including a corporation and the individual 
shareholders of such corporation, who is employed as an 
agent, servant, or employee may agree with his employer to 
refrain from carrying on or engaging in a business similar 
to that of the employer and/or from soliciting customers of 
the employer within a specified parish or parishes, 
municipality or municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as 
the employer carries on a like business therein, not to 
exceed a period of two years from termination of 
employment. . . .77 
A. Time Limit—Two-Year Restraint 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:921(C) provides that, to 
be enforceable, a noncompete is “not to exceed a period of two 
years from termination of employment.”78 This requirement, unlike 
some of the others, is completely clear. The time limit originated 
with the first exceptions to unenforceability in 1962.79 Unlike some 
of the other portions of the statute, which have repeatedly changed 
over time, the time limit has provided for enforceability for two 
years since its inception over 50 years ago.80  
B. Geographic Listing Requirement—Specifying Parishes, 
Municipalities, or Parts Thereof 
The statute also requires noncompete agreements to be limited 
by geography to some “specified parish or parishes, municipality 
or municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer carries 
on a like business therein.”81 This language can properly be 
characterized in two ways: (1) as a drafting requirement, in that it 
requires the parishes, municipalities, and parts to be “specified” 
within the agreement itself, and (2) as a substantive limit, requiring 
that noncompetes be limited in enforcement to parishes where the 
                                                                                                             
 77. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2015). Working as an employee 
in an existing business similar to the employer constitutes “carrying on or 
engaging in” that business as per Subpart D of the statute passed in 2003. Id. § 
23:921(D). See discussion supra Part I.B.5. 
 78. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015). The question of 
whether a court would nullify an entire agreement or simply shorten the 
enforceability to two years if an agreement provides for a longer period of time 
has not been answered in Louisiana.  
 79. Act No. 104, 1962 La. Acts 251–52. 
 80. Id. 
 81. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015). 




first employer actually “carries on a like business therein.”82 
Whereas the second requirement mandates an assessment of where 
an employer actually does business and the nature of that business,83 
the first requirement is amenable to mere careful drafting. 
1. Generally—Listing Political Subdivisions Where Business Is 
Carried On 
The requirement that a noncompete specify a parish or parishes 
in which the former employee cannot compete precludes 
agreements that contain no geographic restrictions whatsoever.84 
The statute has also been interpreted to preclude agreements with 
geographic limitations that courts view as being so broad that they 
constitute no practical geographic limitation at all.85 It should be 
                                                                                                             
 82. Id. This second meaning is addressed more fully in the discussion of 
competition below, which incorporates the phrases “like business therein” and 
“carrying on or engaging in a business similar,” the two phrases that ensure that 
the employer and employee are trying to engage in the same type of conduct 
within the specified geography, into a discussion of the conduct that constitutes 
competition. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 83. In requiring employers to list the areas in which they do business, the 
substantive requirement of the geographic limit gets at the basis for enforcing 
noncompetes in these circumstances—potential unjustified harm to employers’ 
businesses. If the employer does not do business in a parish, it would make no 
sense to restrain the former employee from doing business there, because that 
business would do no direct harm to the employer’s business. See discussion 
infra Part III.B. 
 84. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Guidry, 724 F. Supp. 2d 612, 622 
(W.D. La. 2010) (“Not only does the clause fail to specifically list the parishes 
that it covers, it also fails to reference or list any other data from which its 
geographical scope could be determined.”); Action Revenue Recovery, L.L.C. v. 
eBusiness Grp., L.L.C., 17 So. 3d 999, 1003 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2009) (“The 
absence of the required geographic limitation is fatal to a noncompetition 
agreement and renders it invalid.”); Elite Coil Tubing Solutions, L.L.C v. 
Guillory, 93 So. 3d 861, 866 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2012) (“The lack of a 
geographical restriction in a noncompetition agreement is fatal to the agreement 
and renders it invalid and unenforceable.”). The Third Circuit view differs from 
the other circuits. Despite the statutory language saying “specified,” the Third 
Circuit has found that a listing is not necessarily required to avoid nullity. 
Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Landry, 846 So. 2d 798, 800–01 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
2003). In the context of a non-solicitation agreement, however, the Third Circuit 
invalidated an agreement that did not specify the Parishes. H.B. Rentals, LC v. 
Bledsoe, 24 So. 3d 260, 263 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2009). Thus, it appears that there 
may be a split within the Third Circuit itself. 
 85. See, e.g., Comet Indus., Inc. v. Lawrence, 600 So. 2d 85, 87 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 1992) (noting that the “agreement at issue purports to prohibit 
Lawrence from competing against Comet ‘anywhere within the continental 
United States,’” which is unenforceable). This type of case shades into the 
substantive requirement, because it might be argued that the reason such broad 




noted that courts allow agreements to span multiple states, as long 
as they list the parishes and counties where the employer does 
business.86 Additionally, courts have upheld agreements listing all 
of the parishes in the state when the employer did business in each 
parish.87 Thus, the cases make it clear that a certain level of 
specificity is required.  
Given this specificity requirement, agreements whereby an 
employee agrees not to compete within “the area in which the 
employer does business” are invalid as not specific enough.88 The 
policy behind this rule seems to be one of putting the employee on 
notice to “know on the front end what his potential restrictions 
might be.”89  
2. Caveat—Reforming Facially Overbroad Agreements 
Although the general rule is that specific parishes must be 
listed in a noncompete, one huge caveat exists: reformation. For 
almost 20 years, courts have reformed geographically overbroad 
noncompetes.90 When there is a severability clause, courts are 
willing to modify an agreement by enforcing the parts determined 
to be enforceable, rather than annulling the entire agreement.91 
Nationally, courts often have the ability to reform or “blue pencil,” 
a power most frequently used in the geographic context.92 In 
                                                                                                             
 
restrictions were held to be invalid is only because the employer did not actually 
do business there. 
 86. Action Revenue, 17 So. 3d 999. 
 87. See, e.g., Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 951 So. 2d 247, 258 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 2006). 
 88. See, e.g., Aon Risk Servs. of La., Inc. v. Ryan, 807 So. 2d 1058, 1062 
(La. Ct. App. 4th 2002); Lobrano v. C. H. Robinson Worldwide Inc., No. 10-
CV-1775, 2011 WL 52602, at *7 (W.D. La. Jan. 7, 2011). 
 89. Aon Risk, 807 So. 2d at 1062. 
 90. See AMCOM of La., Inc. v. Battson, 666 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d), rev’d, 670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996) (mem.) (overruling the Second 
Circuit’s refusal to allow reformation). 
 91. Nationally, this practice is generally referred to as “blue penciling” the 
agreement. See, e.g., Advance Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Roadtrac, 551 S.E.2d 
735, 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil 
Down: An Argument for Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 
672, 681–89 (2008) (discussing the three different approaches taken nationally 
to blue penciling). 
 92. Part of the reason more time limitations are not blue-penciled is the fact 
that if a time limit were removed it would make the agreement broader and 
many courts do not rewrite agreements. Instead, courts simply strike offending 
terms. Thus, even after removing the offending term—the time limit—the 
agreement is still unenforceable. See Joy v. Hay Group., Inc., No. 02-C-4989, 




Louisiana, all reported cases of reformation occurred in the context 
of noncompetes that contained overbroad geographic limits.93 
Although the permissibility of reforming agreements was once a 
contentious issue in Louisiana,94 it seems that the idea of 
reformation is no longer controversial, and courts will engage in it 
when the agreement contains a severability clause, also known as a 
savings clause.95  
The Louisiana Supreme Court first addressed the issue of 
reformation, albeit in a cursory fashion, in AMCOM v. Battson.96 
The trial court reformed a radio station’s noncompete agreement 
with its former employee that specified a 75-mile radius within 
which the employee could not compete.97 The trial court found that 
the geographic constraint was overbroad and reformed the 
agreement by only enforcing the restriction in parishes where the 
radio station actually competed.98 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
reversed and rendered judgment for the former employee, holding 
that reformation of noncompete agreements is not permissible 
under the statute, declaring that the invalidity of one clause 
rendered the entire agreement unenforceable.99 The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
 
2003 WL 22118930, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2003) (“While many courts 
decide to apply the blue pencil doctrine and slightly modify agreements that are 
overly broad, courts generally try to stay away from rewriting agreements or 
make drastic modifications . . . .”); see also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 11, at 
119. 
 93. This author’s search for Louisiana cases on the subject revealed no 
broader use of reformation than on geographic restrictions. Perhaps part of the 
reason for this limit is that this type of reformation is the only type that has been 
specifically approved by the Louisiana Supreme Court. See AMCOM, 670 So. 
2d at 1223; SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294, 308 
(La. 2001). 
 94. See Lyon, supra note 21, at 624–25. 
 95. SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 309 (noting that the court, because there was a 
severability clause, would sever the agreement from the unenforceable section). 
But see L & B Transp., L.L.C. v. Beech, 568 F. Supp. 2d 689, 698 (M.D. La. 
2008) (stating that it would follow the “majority line of jurisprudence which 
does not support reformation of the non-compete provision in this case,” even 
though there was a savings clause). 
 96. AMCOM, 670 So. 2d at 1223. 
 97. See id.; AMCOM of La., Inc. v. Battson, 666 So. 2d 1227, 1227, 1229 
(La. Ct. App. 2d), rev’d, 670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996) (mem.). Although this case 
took place before some of the changes to the law noted in Part I.B, the 
subsequent changes do not affect the analysis of reformation under AMCOM. 
See J & S Res., L.L.C. v. R-4, L.L.C., 63 So. 3d 393, 395 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011) 
(refusing to reform the agreement due to the absence of a severability clause 
therein). 
 98. AMCOM, 666 So. 2d at 1227, 1229. 
 99. Id. at 1229. 




granted writs, reversed the Court of Appeal, and reinstated the 
judgment of the trial court in a two-sentence opinion.100 Accordingly, 
reformation is permissible under the statute. 
Since AMCOM, courts have continued to recite the rule that an 
invalid noncompete will be reformed if it contains a severability clause 
and it is enforceable without the violating term.101 In SWAT 24, the 
2001 opinion that still seems authoritative on issues not touched by the 
2003 contrary legislation,102 including reformation, the Court 
reiterated that reformation is indeed possible under AMCOM.103 After 
deciding that the agreement in the case was overly broad, the SWAT 24 
Court discussed AMCOM and the principle of reformation.104 The 
Court stated that it approved of the reformation in AMCOM because 
“the severability clause did not require a court to reform, redraft, or 
create a new agreement. It required only that the offending portion of 
the agreement be severed.”105 The Court in SWAT 24 emphasized that 
the agreement in AMCOM included a specific list of parishes along 
with the overbroad 75-mile radius term.106 Thus, courts will not 
                                                                                                             
 100. See AMCOM, 670 So. 2d at 1223 (“Judgment of the court of appeal is 
reversed. Judgment of the trial court is reinstated.”). 
 101. See Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 951 So. 2d 247, 257 (La. Ct. App. 1st 
2006) (a severability clause “makes it possible to excise the offending language 
from the non-compete clause without doing undue damage to the remainder of 
the provision”); J & S Res., L.L.C., 63 So. 3d at 395 (refusing to reform the 
agreement due to a lack of clear intent of the parties to enforce anyway by way 
of a severability clause). 
 102. Elite Coil Tubing Solutions, L.L.C. v. Guillory, 93 So. 3d 861, 866 (La. 
Ct. App. 2d 2012) (citing SWAT 24 for statements of rules of interpretation even 
though this case applied post-2003 amendment law); W. Carroll Health Sys., 
L.L.C. v. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d 1131, 1136 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2012) (citing SWAT 24 
despite applying post-2003 amendment law). See discussion supra Part I.B.5. 
 103. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294, 308–09 
(La. 2001) (citing AMCOM, 670 So. 2d at 1223). 
 104. See id. at 308. 
 105. Id. Even though the Court reformed the agreement, the employer still 
failed in its attempt to enforce the noncompete. The Court went on to find that 
after reformation, “there [was] nothing in the language of the Agreement that 
[would] be construed to prohibit the conduct of which SWAT complains.” Id. at 
309. This was because of the Court’s interpretation that the statute did not allow 
restriction of employees going to existing competitors. Id. at 307. See discussion 
supra Part I.B.4. Because of its legal interpretation that the exceptions only 
allowed restraint of employees who left for their own business, rather than that 
of an existing competitor, the Court found that its reformation of the agreement 
did not render it enforceable against the employee. The reformed agreement did 
not cover the employee’s activity under the law as interpreted by SWAT 24 
because he had gone to work for an existing competitor. 
 106. SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 309. The idea of reformation discussed above is 
closely related to the listing of locales requirement discussed in Part II.B.1, 
supra, as the inclusion of a specific list along with a severability clause would 
likely save an agreement from annulment if it were found that an employer did 




rewrite an agreement, but if the agreement contains, for example, one 
clause precluding competition throughout the entire state and a 
separate clause listing parishes in which the employer actually does 
business, courts will likely enforce the noncompete to the extent of the 
listed parishes, but not throughout the entire state. 
C. Competition—How Much Is Enough to Carry on a Like Business 
Therein? 
The third requirement of the statute is essentially that there be 
competition between the former employer and employee.107 Although 
the statute does not use the word “competition,” it is necessarily 
required because of the nature of noncompetes, which can only be 
breached by actual conduct. In the language of the statute, an 
employee may agree to “refrain from carrying on or engaging in a 
business similar to that of the employer and/or from soliciting 
customers of the employer” for the specified period of time within the 
specified area “so long as the employer carries on a like business 
therein.”108 The jurisprudence is by no means clear on the meaning of 
the phrases “carrying on or engaging in a business similar” and “a like 
business therein” as they relate to this competition requirement.109 
Some of this underdevelopment in the jurisprudence is due to the 
posture of many of the cases that reach the appellate level,110 which 
are appealed at preliminary stages that do not lend themselves to in-
depth factual analysis.111  
                                                                                                             
 
not carry on a like business therein or that there was also included an overbroad 
geographic term, such as a catch-all.  
 107. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015). The competition 
requirement is based on two phrases in the statute: “carrying on or engaging in a 
business similar” and “employer carries on a like business therein.” Id.  
 108. Id. The statutory language has two terms under the employee prong—
both “carrying on” and “engaging in”—but only one, “carry on,” under the 
employer prong. See id. This Comment does not draw a sharp distinction 
between these two prongs. 
 109. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 110. See, e.g., H2O Hair, Inc. v. Marquette, 960 So. 2d 250 (La. Ct. App. 5th 
2007) (preliminary injunction); Elite Coil Tubing Solutions, L.L.C. v. Guillory, 
93 So. 3d 861, 867 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2012) (summary judgment). Under the 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, any judgment, either granting or denying, a 
preliminary injunction is appealable as of right immediately. LA. CODE CIV. 
PROC. art. 3612 (2015). The granting of a motion for summary judgment also 
qualifies for immediate appeal as of right, with denials reviewable by 
discretionary supervisory writ or after a final judgment. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. 
arts. 2083, 1915 (2015). 
 111. These procedural postures might mean that facts relevant to the 
determination of whether a company “carries on a like business therein” have 




Elite Coil Tubing Solutions, L.L.C v. Guillory, a Louisiana Second 
Circuit Court of Appeal decision, provides some guidance on the 
possible requirements for finding that an employer carries on a like 
business therein.112 The court affirmed the trial court’s finding of 
unenforceability of a noncompete based on its failure to specify 
parishes and to “produce factual support in opposition to [the 
employer’s] motion to establish that it could satisfy its evidentiary 
burden to enforce the clause.”113 Although the court ultimately 
found that the 200-mile-radius geographic restriction was 
unenforceable because it did not list specific parishes as required 
by the statute, the court noted in dicta that even if the geographic 
listing were permissible, “[t]here was no evidence presented 
demonstrating how [the employer] ‘carrie[d] on’ its business 
throughout the 200-mile area which is the essential statutory test 
for establishing a geographical limit in the first place.”114 This 
indication that the plaintiff did not meet its burden of proving its 
                                                                                                             
 
not been sufficiently developed by a fact-finder at the trial court level, have not 
yet been discovered, or are not discussed by the appellate court because the 
standard of review does not require such discussion. In one case, the Court of 
Appeal noted that “the record contain[ed] very little summary judgment 
evidence detailing the nature of [the employer’s] business.” Elite Coil Tubing, 
93 So. 3d at 867. 
 Another problem with these differing procedural postures and their review is 
the differing burdens of proof. In reviewing a preliminary injunction, a court can 
rely on the employee’s failure to present evidence to show that, for example, the 
64-parish restriction was overly broad. Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 951 So. 2d 
247, 258–59 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2006) (“The defendants asserted this specification 
was overly broad, in that it included parishes in which VarTech did not do 
business, but they failed to offer any proof to show that the specification made 
by VarTech in its agreements was invalid.”). On the other hand, when summary 
judgment has been granted to the employer and the plaintiff employer is 
“required to produce evidence sufficient to establish that it [would] be able to 
satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial,” a court might find, as the Second 
Circuit did in Elite Coil Tubing, that the employer “failed in its opposition to 
defendants’ motion.” Elite Coil Tubing, 93 So. 3d at 867. This holding was 
based on a finding that the plaintiff did not plead or present evidence of its 
competition within the restricted area. Id. 
 One factor that possibly contributes to the lack of jurisprudential 
development may be that employee defendants have not often contested this 
issue in the past, possibly because they actually were competing in the listed 
geography. However, one issue with the rise of the communication and the 
Internet-age is that some companies might contact an area once rather than 
repeatedly, raising the question of whether they are actually “carr[ying] on a like 
business therein.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015). Thus, the 
issue of whether there was competition may be contested much more frequently. 
 112. Elite Coil Tubing, 93 So. 3d at 861. 
 113. Id. at 862. 
 114. Id. at 867. 




activity in the listed area signals that an employer must provide 
some evidence of its activity in the geographic area specified in the 
agreement in order to enforce the noncompete.115  
Although the Elite Coil Tubing case indicates that some facts 
are required to meet the statutory requirement that an employer 
carry on a like business in the places listed, it does not speak to 
what activities constitute such conduct. However, another case, 
H2O Hair, Inc. v. Marquette, does provide some guidance on the 
issue.116 The Louisiana Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s 
“finding that [an employer] d[id] business in Orleans Parish for 
purposes of the non-competition agreement” because a “substantial 
portion of [the employer’s] customers [we]re residents of Orleans 
Parish, and that [employer’s] solicitation of customers in Orleans 
Parish via advertising and other means [wa]s integral to its 
business.” 117 Though it does not establish a minimum threshold for 
“carrying on” under the statute, the fact that it was important in 
this case that a substantial portion of the employer’s customers 
were residents of the parish at issue indicates that there is probably 
some lower threshold at which the number of customers in a parish 
is too few to constitute carrying on a like business therein.118 
One recent Second Circuit case provides additional insight into 
several facets of the competition requirement and possibly gives 
rise to a split in authority. In West Carroll Health Systems, L.L.C. 
v. Tilmon, the court made three points in analyzing a trial court 
judgment that granted an injunction enforcing a noncompete 
between a hospital and its former employee who worked as a 
physician assistant.119 The first of these points is that the language 
of the statute, “carrying on” a “business,”120 “allows for the 
employer to demonstrate significant business activity which might 
be competitively impacted in a parish outside of the location where 
the employee worked.”121 The court stated that the reason the 
statute allows for enforcement of this nature is because of the 
“statutory history . . . and the nature of commercial business 
                                                                                                             
 115. The employer had the burden to respond to the summary judgment 
motion by the employee. Id. This requirement of proof should apply equally to a 
trial on the merits, since the plaintiff employer would have the burden of 
proving its case.  
 116. H2O Hair, Inc. v. Marquette, 960 So. 2d 250 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2007). 
 117. Id. at 259–60. 
 118. Id. 
 119. W. Carroll Health Sys., L.L.C. v. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d 1131, 1132 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 2012). 
 120. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015). 
 121. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d at 1137–38. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) 
(Supp. 2015).  




activity that generally does not abruptly end at the parish line of 
the principal location of a business.”122 Thus, “the lack of an actual 
business facility in [the town where the employee was engaging in 
a business similar to the employer] in this case [was] not the only 
measure for the geographic test of the Statute.”123  
Though this first point seems to support broad enforceability of 
noncompetes, the court limited their enforceability in other 
ways.124 Principally, the court found that the statute required an 
examination of the impact on the former employer.125 This second 
point draws from the distinction made by some courts prior to the 
2003 amendment to the statute, that of owning one’s own business 
or working for a competitor.126 In making that distinction, the court 
stated that when analyzing a noncompete in which the former 
employee starts a business, the competition requirement is met by 
virtue of this fact alone.127 Likewise, if the former employee 
“becomes employed in a competing business, a dual test for the 
restraint is more appropriate as suggested by the ‘and’ in the 
legislative use of the ‘and/or’ expression.”128 In these factual 
situations, the court stated: 
It is not enough that the employee is hired in a competing 
business. The impact of his hiring on the former employer’s 
revenue from customers must be considered. Otherwise, the 
broad measure of the first restraint, “engaging in business,” 
would make the legislative use of the second restraint 
against “solicitation” superfluous.129 
Citing its precedent, Summit, which was arguably overruled on 
the issue as a predecessor to SWAT 24 by the 2003 amendment,130 
                                                                                                             
 122. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d at 1137–38. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) 
(Supp. 2015).  
 123. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d at 1137–38. Though the court speaks in terms of a 
“geographic test,” it is actually considering the geography in relation to the 
“engaging in” requirement. 
 124. Despite finding that the listing of that parish was allowed, the court 
eventually found that the facts did not support enforcing the agreement here. Id. 
at 1141. 
 125. Id. at 1139. 
 126. This case does not represent a complete reversion to the prior rule 
whereby noncompetes could only be enforced when ex-employees started their 
own businesses. It does, however, rely on a distinction that was probably erased 
from the statute by the 2003 amendment. See discussion supra Part I.B.4. 
 127. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d at 1139. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Summit Inst. for Pulminary Med. & Rehab., Inc. v. Prouty, 691 So. 2d 
1384 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1997). This case was one that agreed with the later 
Supreme Court case SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294 




the Second Circuit found that when dealing with an ex-employee 
who goes to work for an existing competitor rather than starting a 
business of his or her own, a dual test applies, which is essentially 
a test that also considers the impact on the employer.131 The court 
acknowledged the 2003 amendment, seeming to read the 
amendment narrowly by calling it a “clarification after the SWAT 
24 ruling.”132 The court stated that this “clarification” by the 
Legislature did not alter its concern stated in Summit “that the 
employer’s restraint over its former employee should be shown to 
                                                                                                             
 
(La. 2001), which was legislatively overruled. See supra Part I.B.3–5. The 
Second Circuit in Summit found that section 23:921(C) covered only instances 
in which the former employee opened his own business or, if he joined an 
existing competitor, solicited the former employer’s customers. See Summit, 691 
So. 2d at 1387. Thus, just like SWAT 24, the court found that the statute could 
not be invoked to prevent an employee from joining another firm and simply 
competing for business. Id. And just as it did in SWAT 24, the 2003 amendment 
adding subpart (D) to the statute overruled that holding. See Act No. 428, 2003 
La. Acts 1791 (“For the purposes of Subsections B and C, a person who 
becomes employed by a competing business, regardless of whether or not that 
person is an owner or equity interest holder of that competing business, may be 
deemed to be carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the party 
having a contractual right to prevent that person from competing.”); see also 
supra Part I.B.3–5 and accompanying notes. For an in-depth analysis of the 
jurisprudence leading up to SWAT 24, see Terrell, supra note 57, at 716.  
 131. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d at 1139. The court supported its bifurcation with the 
following:  
The two categories of the employee’s re-employment, now express in 
Subsection D, have significant differences in their impacts on the 
former employer’s business. If the employee commences a similar 
business as owner, that “like” business is a competitive force regardless 
of the employee’s actual role in the business. Whether or not the 
employee is actively participating in his new venture in a manner 
similar to his services in his former employment, the new business 
itself can competitively harm his prior employer. The same is not 
necessarily true if the employee becomes employed in a competing 
business. The new employer may have long operated as a competitor 
business of the former employer. The measure of the employee’s 
impact in that competitor business upon the former employer’s 
customers, goodwill, revenues or other business interest, as suggested 
by the Statute’s specific customer solicitation concern, remains the 
employer’s burden in seeking injunctive relief. This is a reasonable 
interpretation of the allowance given the employer to temporarily 
restrain its employee under Subsection C in view of the strong general 
prohibition against restraints on a person’s livelihood. 
Id. at 1140. 
 132. Id. Interestingly, a different panel of the same circuit court stated in 2010 
that the amendment was in fact a legislative overruling of SWAT 24. See Green 
Clinic, L.L.C. v. Finley, 30 So. 3d 1094, 1098 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2010). 




promote and protect a ‘reasonable economic goal’ or business 
interest of the employer.”133  
Using this impact analysis,134 the court made its third major 
point concerning the issue of what actually constitutes “carrying 
on” or “engaging in” competition by the former employee.135 
Applying its impact analysis to the facts of the case, the court first 
noted that “[the former employee’s] employment alone in the 
‘specified’ parish . . . [wa]s not dispositive.”136 The court then 
reversed the lower court’s injunction, finding that the hospital had 
not met its burden of proof because “the evidence of [the former 
employee’s] one-day employment at [another] clinic [wa]s not 
sufficient to demonstrate any injury or potential injury to [the 
hospital’s] client base.”137 Because the employer had not shown 
“its need to secure a reasonable economic goal or business interest 
and prevent its injury by the injunction sought against [the former 
employee’s] limited action” in the listed parish, the noncompete 
did not bind the employee’s activity.138 Thus it seems that, at least 
sometimes, short-term employment with a competitor does not 
constitute carrying on or engaging in a business similar to the 
former employer. 
This case demonstrates a possible shift since 2003 in the courts’ 
interpretation of section 23:921. Much of the language used in the 
opinion reflects a level of nuance in the analysis of noncompetition 
agreements that is not often utilized in Louisiana noncompete 
cases.139 This case adds to the confusion of the jurisprudence, with 
some cases finding the competition requirement met by virtue of 
being located in a listed area,140 others examining the actions of the 
former employer to some extent,141 and the Tilmon court using an 
impact analysis when a former employee goes to work for a 
                                                                                                             
 133. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d at 1140. 
 134. Because the test the court used here is based on the employee’s impact 
on the former employer, this Comment will refer to the dual test as an impact 
analysis. 
 135. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d at 1140. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 1141. 
 138. Id.  
 139. See generally Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 951 So. 2d 247 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 2006). 
 140. See id. at 258 (“However, the statute contemplates that the parishes 
specified in the agreement must be parishes where the ex-employer actually has 
a location or customers. Employers are not permitted to lock former employees 
out of markets in which the employer does not operate.”). 
 141. See Elite Coil Tubing Solutions, L.L.C. v. Guillory, 93 So. 3d 861, 867 
(La. Ct. App. 2d 2012). 




competitor.142 If the reasoning and rule from Tilmon,143 or even the 
reasoning from Elite Coil Tubing,144 spreads to other circuits, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court might step in to provide guidance as to 
the proper analysis of the competition requirement. 
III. SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE—FLAWS IN LOUISIANA’S 
APPROACH AS APPLIED TO INTERNET-INTENSIVE BUSINESSES 
The problems of ambiguity in the judicial interpretation of the 
noncompete statute’s competition requirement along with the 
mechanical nature of the two-year time limit have been exacerbated 
by the advent of the Internet age.145 In the context of Internet-
intensive business, Louisiana’s noncompete statute fails to properly 
balance the interests of the employer, the employee, and the public 
in its enforcement of noncompete agreements.  
A. The Clock Stopped in 1962, But Time Does Not Stand Still on 
the Internet 
In 1962, the Louisiana Legislature attempted to make the fact-
intensive judgment call of temporal reasonableness by a priori 
rule.146 Though the time-limit rule is intended to increase 
predictability,147 it has become arbitrary and detached from 
practical reality. When passed a half century ago, the two-year rule 
arguably reflected a world in which business changed at a slower 
pace due to its traditional brick-and-mortar form.148 The two-year 
                                                                                                             
 142. See Tilmon, 92 So. 3d at 1140. It should be noted that Elite Coil Tubing 
was decided by the same circuit, the Second, after the decision in Tilmon. See 
generally Elite Coil Tubing, 93 So. 3d at 867. In fact, Judge Caraway wrote the 
opinion in both cases, albeit while sitting on different panels. See generally id.; 
Tilmon, 92 So. 3d 1131. 
 143. See 92 So. 3d 1131. The Supreme Court denied writs in Tilmon. See 99 
So. 3d 665 (mem.) (La. 2012). 
 144. See 93 So. 3d 861. 
 145. Changes to the modern business world both directly and indirectly 
caused by the rise of the Internet have greatly affected the equities involved in 
the enforcement of noncompetes in most areas of society. This is because of the 
Internet’s vast impact on all facets of society, and all workplaces. Cf. Stone, 
supra note 5, at 732. 
 146. Act No. 104, 1962 La. Acts 251–52. 
 147. Indeed, employers know exactly how long they can restrain employees 
and can be assured that their putting two years in a noncompete will not be a 
problem. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 148. See Stone, supra note 5, at 725 (“Our labor and employment laws have 
been constructed on the basis of a view of the employment relationship that saw 
the employment relationship as a long-term relationship between a firm and an 
employee in which the employer gave the worker an implicit promise of lifetime 




limit, however, no longer reflects the contemporary pace of 
business practices. Even when the statute was revised in 1989,149 
despite the existence of desktop computers and early versions of 
the Internet, circumstances were much different than they are today 
in terms of business realities.150 This two-year rule, while 
providing a very bright line, creates unfair results, not only in the 
context of Internet-intensive business, but also for all business 
models today.151 
In terms of business realities, employment markets have 
changed drastically because of connectivity and other factors 
related to technology.152 For instance, lifetime employment with 
one company is less likely in the information age.153 Also, 
employment models have shifted from vertical ladders to 
horizontal, or lateral, employee movement between and among 
employers.154 These developments contribute to the onerous nature 
of a two-year ban from working in an area; unlike in the past 
where job security was much more commonplace and more fixed 
“ladders” of advancement were in place within companies,155 
today’s business environment requires flexibility on the part of 
employers.156 When the two-year limit was first put in place, these 
fast-paced changes in employment were much less likely to occur, 
such that employers had a greater interest in protecting their 
investments in human capital made over time with the expectation 
that employees would be there to return on those investments for 
years to come.157 
At least one court has found that the changing business realities 
of the Internet should have some effect on the length of time for 
which noncompetes are enforceable.158 This New York case, where 
the employee was a company executive for a website operator, 
                                                                                                             
 
job security and opportunities for promotion along clearly-defined job 
ladders.”). 
 149. See discussion supra Part I.B.3–5. 
 150. See Stone, supra note 5, at 732 (pointing out the vast changes recently 
caused by decentralization in the workplace); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 5, at 11. 
This argument does not apply to the competition ambiguity problem with the 
current law, because that problem is not caused by so inflexible a rule as an 
arbitrary number that cannot adjust with changing times.  
 151. See Stone, supra note 5, at 732; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 5, at 11. 
 152. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 5, at 11. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See Stone, supra note 5, at 732. 
 155. See id. at 725. 
 156. See id. at 732. 
 157. See id. 
 158. EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 




found that “the one-year duration of [an Internet company’s] 
restrictive covenant [was] too long given the dynamic nature of 
this industry, its lack of geographical borders, and [the executive’s] 
former cutting-edge position with [the company] where his success 
depended on keeping abreast of daily changes in content on the 
Internet.”159 Thus, even though at least one jurisdiction has 
recognized that Internet-intensive business requires a somewhat 
different calculus,160 Louisiana courts have been hamstrung by the 
inflexibility of Revised Statutes section 23:921 as currently 
drafted. In the situation of the hypothetical graphic designer, 
Charlie, a Louisiana court would be required to enforce the 
agreement for the full two years despite the possibility that its 
utility might wane to such an extent over that time that it would no 
longer make sense to enforce it.161  
B. Carrying on and Engaging in Ambiguity—The Competition 
Requirement 
The most troubling issue presented by Louisiana noncompete 
law is the question of what constitutes competition within a listed 
geographical area. Revised Statutes section 23:921(C) requires 
both that the employee be “carrying on or engaging in a business 
similar” to the employer and that the employer “carr[y] on a like 
business” in the listed geographical area.162 This issue creates 
complexities relating to both competition and the geographical 
specification requirements. One gap in current law and business 
practice is that Internet-intensive businesses naturally are more 
widely dispersed than traditional businesses.163 Thus, because of 
the decentralizing effects of Internet advertising and other Internet-
                                                                                                             
 159. Id. 
 160. See id.; Stone, supra note 5, at 732; Mann & Roberts, supra note 4, at 
339; Jason S. Wood, A Comparison of the Enforceability of Covenants Not to 
Compete and Recent Economic Histories of Four High Technology Regions, 5 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 14 (2000); DoubleClick Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 
731413, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997) (“Moreover, the one-year period 
sought by plaintiff is too long. Given the speed with which the Internet advertising 
industry apparently changes, defendants’ knowledge of DoubleClick’s operation 
will likely lose value to such a degree that the purpose of a preliminary injunction 
will have evaporated before the year is up. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction 
issued below shall expire after six months from the date of this opinion. Plaintiff 
may for good cause move to extend the life of the preliminary injunction.”). 
 161. This assertion assumes that the agreement meets the other requirements 
of the statute. 
 162. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015). 
 163. Mann & Roberts, supra note 4, at 339 (discussing Nat’l Bus. Servs., Inc. 
v. Wright, 2 F.2d 701 (E.D. Pa. 1998)). 




based communication networks, there is an argument that 
noncompetes are under-enforced with respect to breadth of 
permissible geography.164 
Although some aspects of current Internet-intensive business 
practice might militate toward broader geographic restrictions, at 
other times the statute as currently applied can over-enforce 
noncompetes in light of modern considerations. For example, if 
Charlie had a single customer in one of the parishes listed in the 
noncompete, the entire noncompetition agreement may be 
enforceable solely based on that one customer, regardless of whether 
Charlie took the customer from his former employer and despite the 
fact that most of his business comes from outside of the restricted 
area.165 Even worse, some courts may even go so far as to enforce 
the noncompete in the original hypothetical, where Charlie has no 
customers in the restricted parishes at all, but only works out of his 
home in that parish. Such stringent enforcement, without regard for 
whether the employee is trying to compete against the former 
employer, is inequitable, because the employee is not harming the 
former employer.166 The problem is that there is simply no clarity 
as to how the law would deal with this situation.167  
Another problem is that the current law, although setting out 
some basic rules, makes no allowances for Internet-intensive 
                                                                                                             
 164. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 165. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 166. See Competition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/competition, archived at http://perma.cc/G8B9-8SXT (last visited Feb. 
22, 2015) (defining competition as “the act or process of trying to get or win 
something (such as a prize or a higher level of success) that someone else is also 
trying to get or win : the act or process of competing”). 
 167. This lack of clarity is partly because cases have not come before 
appellate courts in the proper posture to easily consider the deeper factual issue 
of competition and partly because appellate courts are not sufficiently 
considering the facts of the cases. See discussion supra Part II.C. By the time a 
case has reached the summary judgment stage—the posture of many of these 
appeals—discovery has been completed and there is evidence in the record that 
each party points to in supporting his or her respective side. LA. CODE CIV. 
PROC. art. 966(B)(2) (2015) (discussing support for motions, taking form of 
“pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together 
with the affidavits, if any”). With respect to the preliminary injunction hearing, 
certain facts are being found in the plaintiff’s prima facie case for a preliminary 
injunction, especially with regard to the likelihood of success on the merits. 
Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 951 So. 2d 247, 261 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2006) 
(“Accordingly, based on the trial court’s finding, [employer] was entitled to a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from carrying on or engaging 
in a business similar to that of VarTech in all 64 parishes of this state.”). It is 
problematic that more of these facts are not specifically addressed at the 
appellate level to provide guidance to litigants, contract drafters, and future 
courts on what constitutes competition in a listed geographical area.  




companies and other businesses where geography is a secondary 
consideration or is altogether irrelevant. For example, take the idea 
that a “substantial portion” of customers in one area constituted 
competition in H2O Hair.168 For an Internet-intensive business, 
even this seemingly simple inquiry is difficult to apply. In many 
online businesses, a substantial portion of customers might not live 
in any one area, but rather, the business might have one customer in 
every parish in the state. The interests of the ex-employer, much less 
the public or the employee, are not advanced by precluding someone 
from transacting business in areas that would not affect the 
employer, even if the person’s company is headquartered in the 
same location. The underlying problem is that the basic assumptions 
about the purposes of noncompetes and the policies behind them 
completely break down in this context.169  
There are strong policies against allowing enforcement of 
noncompetes in areas where a company does very little business, 
which might be everywhere at once for an Internet-intensive 
business. The policy of personal freedom has long weighed against 
noncompete enforcement,170 and it is more likely to override the 
business concerns at stake when there is a lower chance of impact 
on the former employer, which is the case when an entity does not 
conduct much business in an area. Relatedly, the person would be 
essentially jobless if it were found that a company did business 
everywhere such that a noncompete with that employer would be 
enforceable everywhere. Another policy is economic growth. One 
commentator, in comparing California’s Silicon Valley with 
technology areas in Massachusetts, points out that one key distinction 
between the areas is how each state treats the enforceability of 
noncompetes.171 This distinction, the commentator argues, has 
contributed to a pro-mobility culture in Silicon Valley, where 
noncompetes are not enforceable at all, and a concomitant lack of 
such mobility in Massachusetts high-tech areas, where noncompetes 
are used “to prevent . . . employees from jumping ship.”172 Some 
have argued that this difference in employee mobility is part of what 
                                                                                                             
 168. H2O Hair, Inc. v. Marquette, 960 So. 2d 250, 259–60 (La. Ct. App. 5th 
2007). 
 169. Cf. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce: 
Move Over Inherently Distinctive Trademarks—The E-Brand, I-Brand and 
Generic Domain Names Ascending To Power?, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 937, 949–50 
(2001). 
 170. Duncan, supra note 23, at 99 (noting the spirit of “free labor”). 
 171. Wood, supra note 160, at 14. 
 172. Id. 




has made Silicon Valley so successful.173 It makes sense that lack of 
employee mobility is dangerous for the economy in the area of 
Internet-intensive business because of the dynamic and creative 
nature of those businesses.174 
These problems, though exacerbated by the explosion of 
Internet-based and Internet-reliant business, are not new. In fact, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court in AMCOM in 1996 arguably 
recognized that Louisiana’s noncompete statute is a poor fit for 
some real-world business situations.175 The Court may have 
realized that it made sense to enforce the agreement in terms other 
than parishes, since the employer was a radio station trying to 
protect its broadcast range.176 This is analogous to the problem 
present with many Internet-intensive companies, where the 
statutory yardstick of competition does not match the realities of 
doing business, illustrating some of the reasons why fairness might 
dictate enforcement based on measures other than geography.177 
Additionally, the longstanding lack of clarity with respect to the 
factual issue of what constitutes competition under the statute is 
not new either.178 However, it tends to create more problems in the 
area of Internet-intensive business because of the lack of clear 
geographic delineation when acting over the Internet.179 Because 
                                                                                                             
 173. See, e.g., id.; Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High 
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not 
to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578 (1999) (arguing that differences in the 
legal infrastructure of Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 in 
Massachusetts provide an explanation for the different levels of success of each 
of these areas). 
 174. See EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 175. See AMCOM of La., Inc. v. Battson, 670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996) 
(mem.). Although the Louisiana Supreme Court did not specifically make this 
statement, since it did not issue an opinion, it can be inferred from the fact that it 
reinstated the trial court’s injunctive order enforcing the noncompete despite the 
appellate court’s reversal. See id. 
 176. AMCOM of La., Inc. v. Battson, 666 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (La. Ct. App. 
2d), rev’d, 670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996) (mem.) (noting the 75-mile restriction). 
Since there is no data on the type of broadcaster used here, it is impossible to 
determine the actual broadcast range. 
 177. This is not to say that noncompetes should generally be more broadly 
enforced. This simply provides an example of the court’s recognition that the 
statute makes it difficult to properly balance the interests at stake in each 
individual case. 
 178. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 179. See, e.g., Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 2011). In 
the context of a personal jurisdiction analysis, the court stated that “[t]he basic 
problem with relating such activities directly to the general principles developed 
pre-internet is that, in a sense, the internet operates ‘in’ every state regardless of 
where the user is physically located, potentially rendering the territorial limits of 
personal jurisdiction meaningless.” Id. 




of the inequity of the time requirement allowing noncompetes to 
restrain former employees for two years, the ambiguity of what 
constitutes competition, and the tacit acknowledgement by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court in AMCOM that the statute and 
jurisprudence does not always reach fair results, a more workable 
formulation of Louisiana’s noncompete law is necessary. 
IV. A COORDINATED EFFORT—LOUISIANA’S SOLUTION 
FOR THE NEW ECONOMY 
Two paths to greater coherency in Louisiana noncompete law 
would ameliorate or completely eliminate the main problem areas 
highlighted in this Comment: action by the courts and by the 
Legislature. With respect to the ambiguity in the statute as to what 
constitutes competition, the courts should give full meaning to the 
phrases “carrying on or engaging in” and “carr[ying] on a like 
business therein” by inquiring into the impact of the former 
employee’s conduct on the former employer to determine whether 
the former employee’s conduct actually constituted competition. In 
explicating this definition, the appellate courts should provide 
fuller factual analysis of the conduct at issue in each case in order 
to guide future cases. With respect to the unfairness of restraining 
employees for two full years, the Legislature should amend the 
statute to allow enforcement of noncompetetes for a reasonable 
time up to two years. Although these two proposals are both 
necessary for proper balancing of noncompete policy in Louisiana, 
either could be implemented independently of the other.180 
A. Judicial Solution to Ambiguity in the Competition 
Requirement—Adopting an Impact Analysis  
The courts should interpret the language of the statute “carries 
on a like business therein” and “carrying on or engaging in”181 to 
require a fact-specific inquiry into the impact of the former 
employee’s conduct on the business interests of the former 
employer. This impact analysis should “measure . . . [the] impact . . . 
upon the former employer’s customers, goodwill, revenues or other 
business interest.”182 Because the judiciary might be reluctant to 
                                                                                                             
 180. Action on either of these would help to a great extent. If the Legislature 
does not act on the time-limitation proposal, the courts would still remain free to 
act on the judicial interpretation of the competition requirement. 
 181. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015). 
 182. W. Carroll Health Sys., L.L.C. v. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d 1131, 1140 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 2012). 




interpret the statute in such a way given the tennis match between 
courts and the Legislature over the statute, this Comment also 
proposes a legislative change to the same effect, if the judiciary 
fails to act. 
In the context of Internet-intensive business,183 such a rule 
would provide more clarity in the long term because of the ability 
of courts to delineate what constitutes competition within a parish. 
In applying the proposed rule to Internet-intensive business, being 
“within the parish” requires more than just being located there and 
instead requires some material impact on a legitimate business 
interest in that location. After all, the true goal of the competition 
requirement is to protect businesses from unjustified negative 
impact on customer bases, return on investment in human capital, 
and the employers’ most valued information.184 In the context of 
Internet-intensive business, the impact inquiry is the clearest 
standard that could be applied while still being couched in 
geographic terms so as to provide a workable standard for both 
modern and more traditional businesses. 
Determining whether an employer carries on business in a 
certain parish or whether the employee carries on or engages in 
business there needs greater factual development. These are, or 
should be, highly fact-specific and fact-intensive inquiries.185 The 
level of impact on the former employer by the former employee’s 
conduct should be inherent in this fact-intensive inquiry.186 This 
                                                                                                             
 183. To be clear, this proposed judicial interpretation would apply to all 
employer–employee noncompetes under section 23:921. Indeed, one court has 
examined the impact and made a fact-specific analysis similar to that proposed 
here, even though it was not an Internet business case. See generally Tilmon, 92 
So. 3d 1131; see also discussion supra Part II.C. However, Internet-intensive 
business provides a fitting example for why the change is necessary. In the 
context of traditional business, this interpretation would not have precluded 
enforcement of any noncompetes actually breached under the terms of the 
statute. 
 184. See supra Part II.C; Stone, supra note 5, at 737. 
 185. See SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294, 314 
(La. 2001) (Traylor, J., dissenting). Although part of the reason that factual 
inquiries are somewhat underdeveloped is the procedural posture for many 
appeals, the courts can do more with the facts that they do have, because there is 
often some development at these stages. See supra notes 111, 167 (discussing 
procedural postures on appeal).  
 186. See SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 314 (Traylor, J. dissenting). This 
interpretation also fits within the often-recited requirement that the exceptions to 
unenforceability be interpreted narrowly. See, e.g., Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 
951 So. 2d 247, 255 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2006) (“LSA–R.S. 23:921(C) is an 
exception to Louisiana public policy against non-compete agreements and as 
such, must be strictly construed.”). 




view is supported by the Second Circuit’s Tilmon decision.187 In its 
discussion of whether there was competition sufficient to meet the 
“carries on” requirement of the statute, the court considered the 
impact of the employee’s activities on the former employer’s 
business.188  
The current statutory language supports an impact analysis as 
the method of determining whether employers and employees are 
carrying on business in a certain area. The statutory language is 
written in present tense, with the employee’s prohibited actions 
characterized by “carrying on or engaging in a business similar” 
and the employer’s interest being protected “so long as [it] carries 
on a like business therein.”189 The verb carry appears once in the 
present tense, “carries,” and once in the present-continuous tense, 
“carrying.”190 Both of these tenses suggest that the term requires 
some sort of continuing activity, such that doing something 
irregularly is not “carrying on” and doing something in the past, 
even if regularly, does not “carry on.”191 The other operative word 
here, “engaging,” only appears on the employee side of the 
statutory analysis.192 It also is written in present-continuous tense, 
likewise suggesting that an employee must be currently competing 
in order to breach the noncompete.  
                                                                                                             
 187. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d 1131. 
 188. Id. at 1140. The court said: 
The two categories of the employee’s re-employment, now express in 
Subsection D, have significant differences in their impacts on the former 
employer’s business. If the employee commences a similar business as 
owner, that “like” business is a competitive force regardless of the 
employee’s actual role in the business. Whether or not the employee is 
actively participating in his new venture in a manner similar to his 
services in his former employment, the new business itself can 
competitively harm his prior employer. The same is not necessarily true 
if the employee becomes employed in a competing business. The new 
employer may have long operated as a competitor business of the former 
employer. The measure of the employee’s impact in that competitor 
business upon the former employer’s customers, goodwill, revenues or 
other business interest, as suggested by the Statute’s specific customer 
solicitation concern, remains the employer’s burden in seeking injunctive 
relief. This is a reasonable interpretation of the allowance given the 
employer to temporarily restrain its employee under Subsection C in 
view of the strong general prohibition against restraints on a person's 
livelihood. 
Id. 
 189. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. See Tilmon, 92 So. 3d 1131, 1137–38; see also discussion supra Part 
II.C. 
 192. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015). 




In addition to suggesting that the activities must be active 
rather than static, the statutory language suggests that activities 
need to happen more than once to qualify as competition under the 
statute. The term engage means “to begin and carry on an 
enterprise or activity.”193 Similarly, carry on means “to continue 
doing, pursuing, or operating.”194 These definitions suggest some 
type of continuous activity, which presupposes repeated conduct. 
The existence of this threshold suggests examining the harm 
caused to the former employer in order to determine whether the 
employee was “engaging in” or “carrying on” business in the 
parish.195 The fact that the Alabama statute, which is the source of 
the Louisiana statute, has been interpreted by the courts of that 
state to incorporate a reasonableness analysis lends additional 
support to this more flexible interpretation.196  
This interpretation of the statute as requiring an impact analysis 
draws support from Justice Traylor’s dissent in SWAT 24: “A 
better approach to achieve the legislative intent while preserving a 
balance between employers and employees in the commercial 
marketplace would consider the words of the contract, whether the 
employers are competitors, and the employee’s position and its 
impact on the former employer.”197 Justice Traylor posited that 
giving effect to the legislative intent, the “key factor in evaluating 
a[] noncompetition clause’s enforceability is the impact on the 
                                                                                                             
 193. Engage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/engaging?show=1&t=1384184869, archived at http://perma.cc/4HQ4-33XM 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 194. Carry on, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/carry%20on, archived at http://perma.cc/WCU3-7GF3 (last visited Feb. 20, 
2015). The dictionary, in connection with this definition, provides “carried on the 
business” as an example of its use. Id. 
 195. It would be difficult to provide a workable standard that did not 
examine the impact the employee’s activity had on the employer without just 
setting an arbitrary number of repeated competitive conduct that was per se 
competition under the statute. This solution would be as bad as the current 
formulation, since it would rid the interpretation of all nuance and fact-specific 
inquiry. 
 196. See supra note 21. The language of the Alabama statute is remarkably 
similar to the current language of 23:921. 
(b) One who sells the good will of a business may agree with the buyer 
and one who is employed as an agent, servant or employee may agree 
with his employer to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar 
business and from soliciting old customers of such employer within a 
specified county, city, or part thereof so long as the buyer, or any 
person deriving title to the good will from him, or employer carries on 
a like business therein. 
ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (2002). 
 197. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294, 314 (La. 
2001) (Traylor, J., dissenting). 




former employer’s ability to compete with the new employer.”198 
He then proceeded to examine the facts in an effort to determine 
whether the defendant, the ex-employee, was actually competing 
with his former employer.199 Though this factual review dealt with 
the similarity of the employee’s new job to his old job,200 the 
analysis would just as easily apply to a factual examination of the 
extent of competition within a parish, asking whether there was an 
effect on the former employer. This type of analysis would be 
especially helpful in the Internet context, given the indeterminacy 
of geography as an accurate proxy for actual competition than it 
might be for more traditional business.201  
Past versions of section 23:921 addressed two specific business 
interests, the elimination of which could suggest the Legislature 
intended to get rid of the specific consideration of identified 
business interests.202 However, it is more likely that the Legislature 
did this to overrule the narrow interpretation given by the court in 
Foti203 rather than to eliminate all consideration of competitive 
harm.204 Courts focusing on the legitimate business interests of an 
employer with respect to a former employee’s behavior would not 
be reading out words in the statute as Foti did. Instead, this 
interpretation gives full effect to the legislative intent of enforcing 
noncompetes where it is fair to do so.205 
Another counterargument is that this judicial interpretation, as 
with the proposed statutory amendment to the temporal restriction,206 
creates more uncertainty. First, this argument is undercut by the 
fact that the jurisprudence is already very ambiguous. This 
proposal would inject more structure into the current analysis. 
Second, to the extent that this judicial interpretation does create 
uncertainty, the Legislature has already acquiesced to a certain 
level of uncertainty within the statute by not overruling AMCOM v. 
                                                                                                             
 198. Id. at 316. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. This is not to say that the impact analysis should not be adopted for non-
Internet-intensive businesses, but simply that the argument in favor of the 
impact analysis is even stronger in the Internet context. 
 202. See Act No. 104, 1962 La. Acts 251–52 (providing for enforceability 
only “in those cases where the employer incurs an expense in the training of the 
employee or incurs an expense in the advertisement of the business that the 
employer is engaged in”). 
 203. 302 So. 2d 593 (La. 1974). 
 204. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 205. As discussed in Part I.B.5, supra, the legislative history indicates that 
the Legislature intended to enforce noncompetes equitably. 
 206. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 




Batson,207 though it has been very active in overruling the Supreme 
Court on other issues arising under section 23:921.208 AMCOM 
stands for the proposition that courts may enforce noncompetes 
despite their being facially unenforceable.209 Thus, predictability 
and certainty have already been lost to some extent.  
Though it might be argued that moving away from geographic 
indicia altogether is warranted and that some other indicator should 
be used, such a drastic change is not necessary. For one, upsetting 
the developed jurisprudence in employer–employee noncompetes as 
a whole is unnecessary and would be far too disruptive, especially 
since a solution without some geographic nexus is not apparent.210 
Also, there still needs to be a uniform general standard that applies 
to all types of employer–employee noncompetes without regard to 
Internet versus non-Internet companies. One danger that would 
come from completely unhinging enforcement from geographical 
limits is the possibility of running afoul of a very basic principle of 
this area of law: that there must be limits on the extent to which an 
employee is bound.211 Specifying a geographic area has the potential 
to be an effective limit on the scope of noncompetes in certain 
businesses. The impact analysis is flexible enough to encompass 
                                                                                                             
 207. 670 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1996).  
 208. See Act No. 639, 1989 La. Acts 1836–37; Act No. 428, 2003 La. Acts 
1791. The Legislature was presumably aware of the current state of the law in 
2003 when it overruled SWAT 24, which already included the ability to reform at 
that time. See AMCOM, 670 So. 2d 1223. The Legislature has since acted with 
respect to the statute on multiple occasions, none of which speak to reformation. 
See supra note 65 (citing amendments to section 23:921). 
 209. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 210. Thus, the impact solution suggests moving from complete reliance on 
geography to only a partial reliance on geography, with more of a focus on the 
competition within that geography. 
 211. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2015) (where the allowance of 
noncompetes is an exception to the general prohibition). The entire reason for 
requiring listing of the parishes and other subdivisions is to put the employee on 
notice as to exactly where he or she cannot compete. H.B. Rentals, LC v. 
Bledsoe, 24 So. 3d 260, 262–63 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2009). 
Here, H.B. not only fails specifying the parishes or municipalities in 
which Bledsoe is prohibited from soliciting customers, it also attempts 
to prohibit him from soliciting potential customers. We cannot discern 
whether this refers to customers of H.B. at the time of the agreement, at 
the time Bledsoe left H.B.’s employ, or at any time present or future. 
The inclusion of potential customers is particularly troubling, in that it 
can be assumed that any entity in the field is a potential customer. 
Unlike the situation in Petroleum Helicopters, this provision is simply 
so overly broad that any attempt to reform it would not be in keeping 
with either the letter or spirit of the statute. 
Id. at 263. 




both business models: those in which geography is important and 
those in which it is not. 
Another counterargument is that courts might be reluctant to 
adopt this interpretation based on past experience with being 
legislatively overruled. This counterargument has some resonance 
because the Court’s narrow interpretations in Foti and SWAT 24, as 
well as circuit precedent leading up to those cases, were overruled 
by the Legislature.212 However, courts should not be hesitant 
because this approach does not narrow enforceability in the same 
way as Foti and SWAT 24.213 Rather, it provides more legitimacy 
to the statutory regime by interpreting it in a way that properly 
balances the interests at stake, which was the goal of the statute,214 
and it does so without going too far. Because this change would 
make the enforcement of noncompetes more fair, the judicial over-
narrowing that the Legislature has reacted to at least twice in the 
past would be less likely to occur,215 as judges would not feel the 
need to engage in creative interpretation. This interpretation is 
unlikely to, as Justice Traylor predicted in his dissent in SWAT 24, 
“prompt[] the legislature to amend the statute . . . [by] constru[ing] 
the statute so narrowly that effectively no competitive agreements 
can be enforced.”216 Accordingly, courts should adopt the impact 
analysis in determining whether the employee is “carrying on or 
engaging in a business similar to that of the employer.”217 
Although a judicial gloss would be the optimal solution, 
considering that the problem is one of current judicial interpretation, it 
is possible that the judiciary might be hesitant to make such an 
interpretation.218 The Legislature should act if the judiciary does not. 
The Legislature could change language like “carries on a like business 
therein,” to simply “competes therein.”219 This linguistic modification 
                                                                                                             
 212. See discussion supra Part I.B.2–5; Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 
So. 2d 593 (La. 1974); SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 
294 (La. 2001). 
 213. See cases cited supra note 212. These two decisions both took entire 
types of cases out of the consideration of the statute by reading that “substantial 
sums” had to be expended for the statutory exception to apply, or that the 
exceptions only applied to employees who open their own business rather than 
going to an existing competitor. See supra Part I.B. 
 214. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 215. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 216. SWAT 24, 808 So. 2d at 310 (Traylor, J., dissenting). 
 217. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (Supp. 2015). 
 218. It seems that the Second Circuit has moved rather firmly in this 
direction. See W. Carroll Health Sys., L.L.C. v. Tilmon, 92 So. 3d 1131, 1137–
41 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2012). 
 219. For the full statute incorporating both revisions proposed by this 
Comment, see infra note 225. 




would leave the courts no choice but to consider the impact of the 
subsequent activity on the former employer; competition, as a matter 
of plain language, requires an effect or threatened effect on the 
employer.220 This change would, without restricting the flexibility of 
the jurisprudential standard, spur the courts to action in defining the 
specifics of what constitutes competition. Thus, the Legislature’s 
change in language would require courts to engage in the fact-
intensive impact analysis.221 
B. Legislative Solution to Temporal Overreaching 
It is at least arguable that the two-year limitation was too 
lengthy even when it was enacted in 1962 given the state’s 
business climate at that time. 222 However, even assuming that this 
two-year allowance made sense in 1962, it is untenable in today’s 
fast-moving economy.223 The rigidity of the current statutory 
language necessitates a legislative change to inject reasonableness 
into the time limit. The necessity of this change is reinforced by 
the fact that the statutory language has simply been carried over in 
each version of the statute since 1962.224 There is no evidence that 
the Legislature ever adequately considered the time limit’s discord 
with the policies behind noncompetes. Accordingly, it is time that 
the Legislature consider this problem and provide a solution to the 
problem created by its lack of attention.  
                                                                                                             
 220. In the verb form, the word “compete” means “strive to gain or win 
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paced Internet world has had broader implications on business velocity in more 
areas than just the technology industry. It has also led to quicker turnover in 
employees in other types of Internet-intensive firms, as discussed supra Part 
III.A. 
 224. See amendments cited supra note 65. 




The Legislature should amend Revised Statutes section 
23:921(C) to allow for enforcement of noncompetes for a 
reasonable time up to two years.225 Changing from a blanket 
allowance of two years to this more nuanced approach would better 
balance the competing interests in the widely varied factual 
situations that arise under the statute, giving courts the flexibility to 
create appropriate standards for specific types of business. By 
implementing this “reasonable time” standard, both traditional 
business operations and Internet-based companies can adequately be 
covered under the statute. For traditional businesses, courts might 
well find that two years is a proper protection. The point of the 
amendment, however, is to allow for a case-by-case analysis of 
whether the time listed in the noncompete is justified.226  
In this way, the amendment would allow for the consideration of 
the type of business at issue and the particular circumstances of each 
case. Thus, rather than being required to enforce a noncompete for 
two years in a fast-paced technology industry, a court would have 
the ability, just as the New York court did, to find such a time 
restriction to be unreasonable.227 One commentator has even called 
for only three to six months of restraint in light of online business 
realities.228 Under the new standard, a court may agree that this 
time limitation is much more reasonable than a two-year 
restriction.  
In addition to allowing the courts to account for business 
realities of the employer’s business as a whole, the standard would 
also allow for consideration of the particular role of the employee in 
that business. In a case governed by Virginia law, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit analyzed a one-year 
noncompete with specific reference to the job at issue.229 The court 
                                                                                                             
 225. Thus, the statute would read:  
Any person, including a corporation and the individual shareholders of 
such corporation, who is employed as an agent, servant, or employee 
may agree with his employer to refrain from carrying on or engaging in 
a business similar to that of the employer and/or from soliciting 
customers of the employer within a specified parish or parishes, 
municipality or municipalities, or parts thereof, so long as the employer 
carries on a like business therein, for a reasonable time up to two years 
from termination of employment. . . . 
 226. Even for traditional businesses, the economy has changed so much in 
the past 50 years such that two years of enforcement might no longer be 
reasonable either. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 227. See EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
 228. Mann & Roberts, supra note 4, at 340. 
 229. Comprehensive Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 
738–39, vacated and appeal dismissed (4th Cir. 1993). 




stated that the employee’s position as vice president of the software 
company contributed to the reasonableness of the agreement, because 
he “necessarily came into contact with confidential information 
concerning both [the employer’s] products and its customers.”230 
Similarly, Louisiana courts could examine the extent to which the 
specific employee’s role in the business warrants restraint. 
This scheme would have a limited negative impact on employers, 
which is justified by the changing nature of the workplace. First, 
employers should not expect employees to remain as loyal in today’s 
economy.231 In fact, because today’s economy moves at a faster pace 
than in the past, employers might benefit from shorter enforcement 
periods because they would be able to hire from other companies as 
well.232 Additionally, other legal doctrines, such as trade-secret and 
industrial-espionage claims can protect important information that 
need not be bound in a noncompete for two years.233 This more 
nuanced approach would also help employers, because the labor pool 
would not be restricted for nearly as long.  
This amendment would also better provide for the interests of the 
public—greater employee mobility in Internet-intensive businesses 
would allow for a more efficient economy and prevent the burden on 
society imposed by unemployment.234 There is also the possibility 
that a time-limit that more accurately reflects current business 
practices could spur economic growth by facilitating knowledge 
transfers that allow for maximization of resources.235 
                                                                                                             
 230. Id. at 739. Although this case was vacated pursuant to a settlement, it 
provides a good example of the analysis that might be employed by Louisiana 
courts under the “reasonable time” standard. See also Capital One Fin. Corp. v. 
Kanas, 871 F. Supp. 2d 520, 534 (E.D. Va. 2012) (stating that access to 
confidential information because of employee’s job made the agreement more 
reasonable). 
 231. See supra Part III.A. 
 232. Id. It is certainly true that employers may see this benefit and reduce the 
length of the restraint themselves. There is not reliable data on the extent to 
which this voluntary reduction is done. Regardless, court enforcement is 
probably necessary to ensure reasonableness and because the benefit to the 
employer contemplated by the reduced time period would also be beneficial to 
the economy as a whole, allowing for more productive use of human capital 
resources. 
 233. See Stone, supra note 5, at 738. 
 234. See Lyon, supra note 21, at 608–10 (explaining the theory of efficient 
breach impinged by noncompetes and the “connotation of involuntary servitude”). 
Some commentators have said that the enforcement of noncompetes is also 
important to the public because it results in better investment in the training and 
free communication of employees. Blake, supra note 4, at 627. This Comment 
does not advocate for the eradication of noncompete agreements, but rather that 
they be reasonable limits rather than overreaching ones. 
 235. See Gilson, supra note 173, at 578–79.  




Although some may argue that the proposed amendment would 
create a greater level of uncertainty within the statute, it would not 
significantly diminish the current predictability.236 There remains a 
clear two-year maximum, and to the extent that it would diminish 
predictability, it is justified by the more equitable results reached.237 
Jurisprudential holdings could potentially provide more clarity for 
specific factual situations in the long run, so any initial lack of 
clarity would eventually be lowered. Moreover, Louisiana courts 
could look to other states’ case law for guidance in determining the 
reasonableness of a given time restriction, since many states require a 
reasonableness inquiry when evaluating noncompete enforceability.238 
To the extent that the change would increase litigation—which it 
might indeed—this uncertainty is necessary as a matter of fairness.239 
Additionally, the possible increase in litigation would probably be 
only a short-term effect.240 If judicial standards become clearer as to 
what constitutes a reasonable time restraint in certain circumstances, 
then these more reasonable limitations might result in fewer ex-
employees breaching the agreement since the restriction would not 
be as onerous.241 With fewer employees breaching their agreements 
                                                                                                             
 236. One might argue that creating uncertainty here is contrary to the 
legislative intent, an argument that is well taken. After all, in 1989, the 
Legislature seemed to favor rote application of bright-line rules in this context 
by excising the determination of the specified business interests required by the 
previous version of the statute. Act No. 639, 1989 La. Acts 1836–37. 
Additionally, it might be argued that this amendment would destroy a scheme in 
which it is possible to look at an agreement on its face and be able to determine 
its enforceability based on the clear requirements of the statute. See discussion 
supra Part II.B.1–2. The argument goes that such uncertainty may lead to an 
increase in litigation in the area. 
 237. This Comment assumes that courts would continue to reform 
agreements under this amendment when the agreement contains a severability 
clause. This amendment might raise an issue of whether reformation should be 
extended to time-limitation clauses in Louisiana. To the extent that courts would 
be willing to do so, this extension might ease the transition into the new rule, 
since courts would initially be applying post-hoc analysis to previously drafted 
agreements. Retroactivity, while not conceptually problematic for courts, could 
raise issues of fairness until the new rules become more settled. 
 238. See discussion supra Part I.A; see also statutes cited supra note 18. 
 239. A related and more incidental counterargument is that this amendment 
would also allow non-Internet-intensive employees to claim that the two-year 
restriction would be unreasonable in their cases as well. Some of this modification 
based on reasonableness might be warranted. Because of the flexibility of the rule, 
courts are free to balance the interests at stake in each individual case in 
determining how long a time limit is reasonable.  
 240. It is possible that the greater flexibility in the statute would actually lead 
to fewer enforcement suits by employers, who may be more hesitant to spend 
money on litigation that is less likely to be successful. 
 241. Lyon, supra note 21, at 651.  




because they are more fair, litigation would decrease since 
employers would not need to sue to enforce them. 
CONCLUSION 
The Internet has greatly affected competition—and competition 
between employers and former employees is no exception. The rules 
governing employer–employee noncompetes have not kept pace 
with changing competitive interests. To bring Louisiana’s 
noncompete law in line with the twenty-first century, the Legislature 
and judiciary must recognize that Louisiana law is at a breaking 
point and, rather than act as opponents, work together to achieve 
better results. The judiciary should engage in an interpretation of the 
noncompete statute that, while still maintaining the integrity of its 
plain meaning, better adheres to the properly balanced policies 
underlying noncompete agreements in Louisiana. To spur judicial 
action, slight language changes may be necessary to clarify the 
legislative intent that competition, rather than geography, is 
paramount. Under this interpretation, courts would examine the 
impact of a former employee’s conduct on the former employer, as 
impact is a more accurate proxy to competition than relying on 
geography alone. Additionally, the Legislature must act to 
ameliorate the negative policy implications of the inflexible two-
year restraint by modifying the standard to allow for enforcement to 
the extent reasonable for a time not to exceed two years. Under this 
new regime, Charlie, the graphic designer, would have the 
opportunity to operate his website as long as he does not actually 
compete by negatively affecting the business interests of his former 
employer in a material way. Additionally, if he does eventually 
breach this agreement, he would likely be bound for less than two 
years. The proposed changes to Louisiana’s employer–employee 
noncompete law would allow the market to function more 
efficiently to the benefit of employers, employees, and the public. 
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